126 e lusive v ictories
or French colonial policy) he ceded ground. We might note that Lloyd
George, caught between the demands of British public opinion and his
own sense of sound policy, also vacillated on key issues such as German
reparations.
More than anything else, the view that Wilson was bamboozled by
Clemenceau and company refl ects the mistaken conclusion that other
Allied leaders achieved more of their objectives at the conference than
did the president. With the possible exception of Japan, they all
came off badly, failing to secure much of what they had promised
their citizens. Consider, for example, Italy, which expected substantial
territorial acquisitions, received less, and even then could not hold
much of the additional land—a performance that set the stage for the
fascist triumph several years later. Th e major Allied powers, Great
Britain and France, suff ered critical setbacks, both at the conference
and as a consequence of what was or was not done there. Great
Britain expanded its colonial holdings, but its refusal to make good
on the Wilsonian promise of self-determination compromised its
hold over India and provoked restiveness in Egypt. In addition, Lloyd
George did not forge the strong Anglo-American partnership he
sought; quite the contrary, he did not even secure language to fore-
stall a naval arms race with the United States that his country could
not aff ord.
France came away as the ultimate loser, notwithstanding Clem-
enceau’s hard-edged realism. Limited by his traditional outlook,
domestic constraints, and General Foch’s fi erce determination to reduce
Germany to third-rate military status, Clemenceau could not envision
a diff erent kind of relationship with France’s old nemesis. What he
most desired—a permanent alliance among the leading democracies to
withstand a rearmed Germany—he did not achieve. Although Wilson
signed a treaty with the French that promised American help in the
event of an attack on France, he knew the U.S. Senate would never
approve it. (He was confi dent, too, that the League of Nations would
make such agreements unnecessary.) Clemenceau also did not acquire
for France the German territory west of the Rhine, settling instead for
temporary occupation. Finally, reparations fell far below what he
demanded, with no eff ective means to compel payments should the
Germans renege.