Elusive Victories_ The American Presidency at War-Oxford University Press (2012)

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130 e lusive v ictories


Sumter, knowing that the rebels would be likely to fi re upon the relief
ships.
By contrast, Wilson hoped to avoid American entry into the war,
and he managed to do so for more than two years. But his early steps,
specifi cally his decision to confront Germany over its use of submarine
warfare, made war much more likely. Th e president’s stance on U-boat
attacks left it up to Berlin to choose whether and when the United
States would enter the war. By boxing himself in with his 1915 warning,
Wilson also removed from Congress eff ective control over the decision
to enter the war. He understood clearly the absence of real choice when
he called upon Congress in April 1917 to “accept the status of belligerent
which has thus been thrust upon it.”  To the list of means by which
presidents on their own can propel the United States into war, then, we
should add the broad diplomatic powers invested by the Constitution
in the presidency.
As a wartime commander in chief, Wilson accomplished several key
leadership tasks. He determined that the United States must play a
pivotal role at a postwar peace conference, so he would be in a strong
position to shape what happened after the confl ict ended. In Pershing,
the president found a commander who could achieve the necessary
results, despite the general’s limitations. Pershing’s success calls into
doubt the claim that a political leader needs to exercise hands-on
direction of military strategy and closely monitor the actions of military
subordinates. Wilson purposefully chose not to supervise the com-
mander of AEF, a refl ection of the president’s conviction that Lincoln
had meddled too closely in military matters. (However, it might be
recalled that over the course of the Civil War, Lincoln intervened less
often in military decisions. Wilson’s approach was not as diff erent as he
supposed.) Th at Wilson, as unmilitary a president as any who have led
the United States during war, could succeed through his detached
approach suggests that Eliot Cohen and others may be looking in the
wrong place for the answers to what makes for effective wartime
political leadership. Back home, despite initial stumbles, the Wilson
administration managed to mobilize the American people and economy
in time for the AEF to make a key contribution on the battlefi eld in



  1. An innovative propaganda campaign, both at home and abroad,
    helped boost support for Wilson’s bold war goals.

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