f reedom of a ction 139politician, the result of hubris born of the electoral landslide of the
previous year, and he would exercise extra caution to avoid a repeat.)
Always Roosevelt believed himself to be the master of circumstances,
confi dent that he could steer events, if not right away then over time,
in the direction he chose. A political consideration also fi gured in his
refusal to make a commitment. Presidential positions can become
public, either accidentally or because someone leaks them, at which
point they become embarrassing to disavow, especially once enemies
seize upon them as political fodder. ^
Despite Roosevelt’s caution, several factors intruded to undercut the
president’s capacity to manipulate American security policy. Th e fi rst
constraint was domestic public opinion. Isolationism had revived in the
wake of the disappointing results Wilson had secured in the First World
War. Many Americans felt they had been misled into a confl ict that did
little more than enrich certain sectors of American business, an
impression fortifi ed by congressional hearings that highlighted the huge
profi ts that munitions manufacturers had earned during the war. I n
the wake of the hearings and reflecting the public disillusionment,
Congress had passed several neutrality measures between 1935 and 1937.
Th ese included the 1937 Neutrality Act, which precluded arms sales to
belligerents when the United States remained neutral and aimed to
inhibit American fi rms from doing business with nations at war. Th e
Great Depression left hard-pressed citizens preoccupied with their
immediate economic needs, too. With events in Europe or the Far East
posing no direct danger, Americans showed scant interest in distant war
clouds.
It would be a mistake, though, to overstate the degree to which
American public opinion tied Roosevelt’s hands. Even before Germany
struck Poland, Gallup opinion polls showed more than 80 percent of
Americans believed the United States ought to back Great Britain and
France against Hitler and Mussolini. Just as striking, by a two-to-one
margin they favored sending material aid to the Allies. Roosevelt also
possessed extraordinary rhetorical gifts; his occasional radio “fi reside
chats” did much to boost spirits amid the Depression (and to make the
presidency itself a more popular offi ce). Yet he declined to push the
limits of popular support on matters of foreign policy that were
removed from his listeners’ everyday concerns. To the contrary, the