f reedom of a ction 145Th e war between Germany and the Soviet Union also had important
repercussions for the Far East. Japan had been weighing two options for
aggressive military action, a move into Siberia to force the Soviets into
a two-front war versus one southward to obtain control over strategic
resources. Although Tokyo had a neutrality accord with Moscow, key
Japanese offi cials, including the foreign minister, favored an attack on
the Soviet Union to destroy a powerful enemy once and for all. Other
Japanese military leaders countered that the real menace came from the
West, which controlled access to oil and other vital resources, while the
Japanese army in Manchuria preferred not to attack the Soviets without
fi rst securing a large numerical edge.
In early July 1941, a Japanese imperial conference chose to risk con-
frontation with Great Britain and the United States. Both the Russians
and the Americans, through their intelligence sources, soon learned of
the decision. It led Stalin to transfer forces from Siberia to defend
Moscow in late 1941, where the Soviets fi nally threw back the Nazi
onslaught. But the Japanese response to the German invasion of the
Soviet Union also meant time was running out for Japan and the
United States to fi nd diplomatic solutions to their diff erences.
Notwithstanding the march of events that pushed America closer to
war, Roosevelt still resisted making key strategic decisions. He refused
to defi ne defense priorities for senior military planners, leaving them to
guess at his intentions. Even after he reviewed their plans, such as a
recommendation by his military chiefs in November 1940 to concen-
trate the U.S. fl eet in the Atlantic, he declined to endorse or reject
them. When he did make a choice, he favored the option that seemed
most likely to buy him more time. His fascination with air power
reflected his determination to thwart Germany and Japan without
actually going to war or risking the lives of American soldiers.
Beginning with the president’s post-Munich embrace of aircraft pro-
duction, his fi xation on the deterrent value of bombers persisted until
late 1941. Because the United States could strike potential enemies at
long range, he remained confident they (either the Germans or
Japanese) would not risk aggression that might provoke American
retaliation. As a practical defense policy the president’s stand was
absurd (and he soon modifi ed it), but it tells us everything about his
wishful outlook.