f reedom of a ction 153army maneuvers in the prewar period depict the embarrassing state of
readiness. At a time when German panzers had conquered much of
Europe, American armored troops drove trucks with the sign “tank”
affi xed to their sides. But they were in no danger. Th e anti-tank “guns”
aimed by their war-game opponents were wooden poles resting on
stakes.
Roosevelt invested the least eff ort on the third dimension of mobili-
zation, readying the American people for war. Prior to the 1940 presi-
dential election, where he expected a tough battle, electoral calculation
may have played a role. Copying a page from Wilson in 1916, Roosevelt
chose to downplay the likelihood that the nation would become a bel-
ligerent. Less comprehensible was his refusal after winning a third term
to mount an eff ort to infl uence American opinion in favor of entering
the war. He limited himself to speeches, often highly effective,
explaining the importance to the United States of British success and
defending aid to Great Britain. Especially compelling was his March 11,
1941, justifi cation for Lend-Lease:
Suppose my neighbor’s home catches fi re, and I have a length of
garden hose four or fi ve hundred feet away. If he can take my garden
hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out
his fi re.... I don’t say to him before that operation, “Neighbor, my
garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it.”... I don’t
want $15—I want my garden hose back after the fi re is over. ^Th e president still declined to make a public case for American bel-
ligerency, even when he recognized by mid-1941 that war could not be
avoided much longer. He feared that an official propaganda effort
would spark a political backlash. As Americans had soured on the
results of the First World War, critics had looked back at the Creel
Committee and condemned it for promoting chauvinism, intolerance,
and hysteria. Roosevelt, pressed by interventionists to make a case for
war, fi nally established a war information committee in summer 1941
under New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, but its tepid eff orts did
nothing to sway the public.
Just how little had been done to mobilize public support for war
became evident in the six months before Pearl Harbor. Draftees spoke