f reedom of a ction 167to assure fair treatment aroused the ire of southern politicians in his
own party, who condemned all federal intervention in race relations in
their home region and hinted at grave electoral consequences for the
Democratic Party.
Meanwhile, as the military continued to segregate black troops
and assign them to menial duties, racial incidents, including vio-
lence, increased on military bases. Unions also resisted pressures to
accept non-white members, despite federal government prohibitions
on discrimination. As black workers began to secure factory jobs
that previously had been open only to whites, resentful whites inter-
rupted production with “hate strikes” to protest such things as
having to share restrooms with their black co-workers. Th e friction
spilled over outside the plants, too, and led to episodes of broad-
scale violence in a number of cities, including Mobile and Detroit
in 1943.
Roosevelt sought to remain above racial controversy, preferring to
allow various agencies to address the confl icts. Race relations repre-
sented his worst political nightmare: any stance he took would have
carried a political price that might cost him reelection or split his party.
Consider the FEPC: after Roosevelt bowed to southern white demands
in 1942 to curb the commission by subordinating it to the War Man-
power Commission, he faced so much liberal criticism that he felt
compelled to backtrack the following year, restoring its independence
and increasing its budget and staff. Not surprisingly, most of the
heavy lifting against racial discrimination was done below the presi-
dential level—the War Labor Board banned racial diff erentials in wages
in 1943, the U.S. Employment Service prohibited race-specific job
listings, and the National Labor Relations Board ruled it would not
certify unions that barred minority members. Th e armed forces also
responded to the racial challenge by desegregating bases, beginning an
educational campaign against racial prejudice, and taking the fi rst ten-
tative steps to integrate units, mostly on an ad hoc basis and in response
to manpower shortages. Apart from an occasional speech, however,
Roosevelt avoided action on matters of race. He feared, with cause,
sparking a revolt by his party’s powerful southern wing. Th e Demo-
cratic vote in the South declined in 1944, an omen of the fate of the
party in the postwar era.