172 e lusive v ictories
political fate of postwar Europe, the relative infl uence of the United
States and Great Britain in wartime policy and the postwar order, and
more.
Th e American view, expressed forcefully from the outset by Marshall,
held that the cross-Channel assault should be made as early as possible
because the Germans could only be defeated by a direct clash on the
main battlefront. Sometimes mischaracterized as an unimaginative
attrition strategy (which is how the British chose to see it), this
approach did not preclude operational creativity and fl exibility. But the
American perspective also recognized that the Allies did not have
unlimited time with which to work. Th e longer the delay before an
invasion, the stronger the Germans could make their defenses. Th ere
was an “opportunity cost” to be paid in the Pacifi c, too, where time
would allow the Japanese to better fortify their positions. M o r e o v e r ,
the relationship between the Anglo-American allies and the Soviet
Union remained fragile. Too long a delay before the cross-Channel
invasion, American planners worried, might result in Soviet defeat (a
concern until the German surrender at Stalingrad in early 1943),
provoke Stalin to seek a separate peace with Hitler (a persistent fear), or
let the Red Army advance all the way across Europe (a prospect that
loomed larger as Soviet forces drove the Germans back from the second
half of 1943 onward).
Although the British agreed that an invasion would be necessary at
some point, they countered that a premature attack could result in
catastrophe. Having fought the Germans in Norway, France, Greece,
Crete, and North Africa and come off second best each time, the British
had a healthy respect for German military prowess. Th ey wanted to
meet the Germans on favorable terms. To Churchill and his senior
military aides, such as General Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial
General Staff , this meant using their forces and American troops in
campaigns that would wear down the Axis and draw off enough
German resources from France to give an invasion a fair chance of
success. Th e British preferred to continue and extend the war in the
Middle East, including assaults on North Africa and later Sicily, Italy,
and perhaps Greece and the Balkans. Churchill spoke of the approach
as striking the “soft underbelly of Europe,” an evocative phrase but one
that rang hollow to the Allied troops sent there who found it anything