f reedom of a ction 177Th e result was an epic campaign on an island virtually no American
before the war could have found on a map—Guadalcanal. In the seesaw
struggle that followed, American military leaders several times consid-
ered withdrawal, especially when the Japanese landed massive reinforce-
ments in October. Roosevelt insisted that all possible help be sent to
Guadalcanal, and the U.S. troops held. Although both sides lost
heavily, especially in ships, the American losses would soon be made
good while the Japanese would never recover. Th e president also looked
ahead to the day when the Japanese homeland could be subjected to
more than a nuisance bombing raid. He supported the enormous
investment in a new, very heavy bomber project that became the B-29
bomber—and the Manhattan Project to create the atomic weapon that
the B-29 would deliver.
Th e arrival of more American troops, more and better aircraft, and
new ships made possible a general counteroff ensive across the Pacifi c.
So much arrived by mid-1943, in fact, that U.S. commanders could
advance along two axes. In the southwest Pacifi c, U.S. and Australian
forces under MacArthur moved in jumps along the northern coast of
Papua New Guinea, bypassing and cutting off Japanese garrisons. By
summer 1944, the Allied advance had neutralized the key base at Rabaul
and MacArthur contemplated his return to the Philippines. T h e
second line of approach, directed by Nimitz, carried American forces
across the Central Pacifi c, with costly invasions in the Marshall, Caro-
line, and Mariana Islands. In June 1944, at the Battle of the Philippine
Sea, American naval aviators eff ectively destroyed their Japanese oppo-
sites, which meant that the U.S. fl eet no longer needed to fear carrier
attacks. Th e capture of Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas also meant
that Japan itself could be reached by the new B-29 bombers. In all these
campaigns, the president played little direct role, with the decisions
about where and when to attack left largely in the hands of the military
professionals.
An important exception occurred in mid-1944, when the president
traveled to Hawaii to meet with MacArthur, King, and Nimitz.
MacArthur’s and Nimitz’s successes raised the question of where to
attack next. MacArthur adamantly urged the liberation of the Philip-
pines. Navy opinion was split: King preferred a jump to Formosa (Taiwan);
Nimitz saw value in seizing airfi elds and sea bases in the Philippines;