180 e lusive v ictories
as the gateway back to Burma, Malaya, and Singapore. Accordingly,
after defeating a last-throw-of-the dice Japanese attack against Imphal
and Kohima near the Burma-India border in the first half of 1944,
British and Indian troops under General William Slim launched an
off ensive that utterly destroyed the Japanese army in Burma in 1945.
Like MacArthur’s later assaults in the Philippines, Slim’s campaign did
nothing to hasten the defeat of Japan—its forces in Burma were already
cut off and could contribute nothing to the defense of the homeland.
But as part of Churchill’s postwar program, the venture acquired a
political logic. In the same spirit, invasions of Malaya and then Singa-
pore were in the planning stage when the war ended.
Roosevelt’s hands-off posture in the latter stages of both the Euro-
pean and Pacifi c wars raises the question of how much direction he
really exercised over the course of events. Th at he continued to seek
freedom of action remains clear from his determination to avoid
on-the-record decisions as much as possible. Testimony by Marshall
and other senior military commanders confirms that they often
discussed with the president the political implications of military
options, but Roosevelt insisted that no notes or minutes be taken. (For
example, we do not have a record of the 1944 Hawaii conference on the
Philippines invasion; the putative exchanges were reported subsequently
by the participants and are open to question.)
Just the same, much as the president wished to hold open his options,
the decisions he made compelled or invited others, choices that could
not be reversed except at a high political price. When he approved the
invasion of North Africa in 1942, American forces entered a path that
led deeper into the Mediterranean than his military commanders
deemed wise or necessary. Th e soldiers fought in Sicily and then Italy, a
campaign that went on too long and cost too many lives because halting
it outright would further antagonize the British. Much the same
could be said for the Philippines and the bloody invasions that marked
the closing months of the Pacifi c war. For all the self-sacrifi cing courage
demonstrated by U.S. Marines on Iwo Jima, capture of the island was
unnecessary either for the blockade of Japan or to secure a route for a
possible invasion of the Japanese mainland. Enemy civilians also suf-
fered, too, from the irresistible momentum of strategic bombing
campaigns. Roosevelt (and then Truman) let the raids continue past the