10 e lusive v ictories
the creation of its National Health Service. From the demise of presi-
dents’ domestic programs and the schisms that grow among presidents’
supporters, a fourth puzzle emerges: Why do wartime presidents, even
those elected by huge margins, suffer the defeat of their domestic
agenda and the undoing of their reform aspirations?
At fi rst glance wars appear to bestow on presidents dramatic freedom
of action and broad discretion over the use of force. They decide
whether to command in a hands-on manner or to delegate authority,
and they establish national objectives and peace-building goals. Presi-
dents seem to enjoy the kind of strategic fl exibility that scholars see as a
cornerstone of presidential success. For instance, Richard Neustadt
emphasizes the value of fl exibility and urges presidents to take particular
care to think strategically, preserve their options, and safeguard their
power prospects. Presidents retain wide freedom of action when it
comes to the use of force abroad. Indeed, this may be one reason that
presidents in certain political situations tend to choose military
intervention—they see it as a way to sustain their political coalition.
At least where “small wars” (the kind the United States has fought since
1945) are concerned, presidents anticipate positive results when they
exercise their war powers: eff ective military intervention abroad will
yield maximum political advantage at home.
Recent history argues otherwise. No president since the end of
World War II has achieved all of the political objectives he has iden-
tifi ed in going to war. (I do not include brief campaigns conducted with
modest forces, as in Grenada in 1983 or Panama in 1989.) Worse, in
several cases the United States has become bogged down, despite its vast
conventional military superiority. Presidents mired in stalemates have
been unable either to escalate their military commitment or to extricate
the nation from the confl ict. Wars that drag on without victory or exit
have helped to unravel several presidencies, including those of Harry
Truman, Lyndon Johnson, and, as noted at the outset, George W. Bush.
Each has suff ered from sharply declining approval ratings and watched
his party lose the next presidential election.
In short, something about presidential war powers transforms their
wielder from muscular to muscle-bound. Th is presidential frustration
brings us to the fi fth puzzle of wartime leadership: Despite broad fl exi-
bility to deploy coercion abroad against much weaker enemies, why do