182 e lusive v ictories
Democrats anticipated a brief occupation of the defeated Confederate
states followed by a return to self-government under white control.
Lincoln evaded the tension by postponing consideration of Recon-
struction until the end of hostilities. Roosevelt would also delay
decisions as he sought to hold open options, only to discover that events
circumscribed the possible choices as the war drew to a close.
Th e president faced an additional obstacle that besets all bold peace-
building projects. As the agenda becomes more ambitious, the number
of conditions involved increases, too, as do the number of things that
can go awry. It is hard enough for a president to control his own mil-
itary and administration. Earlier presidents had learned that they could
not count on the continuing cooperation of Congress or the ongoing
support of the American public for peace-building initiatives. Even less
could Roosevelt depend on the willingness of key foreign leaders to
stick to his script. For, as Wilson had learned, victory immediately frays
the association of the victors, with each nation instead pursuing its own
interests as it sees them. Th at this pattern of diffi culties would repeat
itself after the Second World War became clear well before the confl ict
ended.
Th e fate of Germany ultimately rested upon the willingness of the
United States to absorb the costs of remaking German society. At
Teheran in 1943, the president, Churchill, and Stalin endorsed in prin-
ciple the idea of dismembering Germany to prevent it from ever again
posing a threat to peace. Th eir accord fi t with the 1944 Morgenthau
Plan, developed by the treasury secretary, to divide Germany and reduce
it to an agrarian society. Roosevelt initially endorsed the plan. B u t
Hull, Stimson, and other key advisors repudiated the “dismember
Germany” approach. As American military commanders pointed out,
any scheme to fragment Germany likely would face resistance from the
German people, a situation that would strain military resources while
the war against Japan continued. Even proponents of thorough eff orts
to root out Nazism and militarism from German society acknowledged
the process could require a military occupation lasting at least a gener-
ation. Th e president and his advisors doubted the American public’s
willingness to sustain a large-scale military commitment for so long a
period. Debate continued into 1945, as here, too, Roosevelt declined to
force closure.