186 e lusive v ictories
bomb continued, with the goal of having one or more weapons ready
during summer 1945.
Th e end of the war against Japan would rest in the hands of Roos-
evelt’s successor, but the cumulative weight of decisions made since
December 7, 1941, left Harry Truman with few real choices. In his fi rst
speech to Congress after taking offi ce, he declared that unconditional
surrender would remain the Allies’ demand. For several months he
adhered to this position, which was refl ected in the Potsdam Procla-
mation issued in July 1945 by the United States, Great Britain, and the
Soviet Union. Th e horrifi c casualties on Iwo Jima and Okinawa left
American leaders determined to explore every alternative to invasion
itself.
Once the fi rst atomic bomb test succeeded, then, Truman moved
ahead with the plan to drop the weapon on a major Japanese city. Not-
withstanding pleas from some scientists involved in the Manhattan
Project, senior American offi cials never seriously revisited the decision
to use the bomb. Th e new president, still feeling his way in offi ce, did
not yet feel comfortable questioning his advisors on military matters,
but no evidence suggests that Roosevelt would have acted diff erently.
After the vast investment in the bomb project ($2 billion, larger than
the entire 1941 defense budget), it was destined to be used unless a pres-
ident forcefully interrupted the process. Truman did fi nally tweak the
surrender terms slightly, to make it possible for the Japanese emperor to
remain on the throne in some capacity. By that point, the fi rst atomic
bomb had tumbled from the B-29 Enola Gay onto Hiroshima, and a
second bomb would fall on Nagasaki before the Japanese fi nally capit-
ulated. Soviet troops meanwhile invaded Manchuria on August 8, 1945,
fulfilling Stalin’s pledge and making plain to Tokyo that it invited
national obliteration if it continued the war.
As the Pacifi c war approached its violent climax, events elsewhere in
Asia showed starkly the limits of Roosevelt’s capacity to shape the
postwar order in the region. Th e United States had almost no ground
troops in the China-Burma-India theater. When the war ended, British
forces were mopping up the last disorganized remnants of the Japanese
army in Burma. Th e British moved quickly to reoccupy Malaya and
Singapore following the Japanese surrender. Roosevelt had hoped to
prevent the French from reestablishing themselves in Indochina.