202the vietnam war claims two dubious distinctions: it was the only
American confl ict to end in unequivocal defeat and, in the process, it
dragged down two presidencies. In part, this outcome refl ected the
nature of the war itself, which American leaders, from Eisenhower
onward, misunderstood. Th ey insisted on treating a minor regional
struggle as a major Cold War test of wills, even though that meant
staking everything on a weak client government in Saigon. Th ey did
not help themselves, either, by the manner in which they directed the
confl ict. Under Lyndon B. Johnson, the United States pursued mil-
itary strategies and fought under self-imposed constraints that assured
a military stalemate; Richard M. Nixon then sought to extricate the
United States from the war in a way that guaranteed the ultimate
collapse of its ally.
No leader could emerge unscathed from such a debacle. Johnson
found himself deserted on both political fl anks, fi rst by liberals who saw
the war as unnecessary and wanted American troops brought home,
and then by conservatives who believed he had thrown away all chance
for victory. Nixon, by insisting on violent measures that yielded tran-
sient military gains, sacrifi ced any possibility of building a domestic
consensus in favor of long-term support for the Saigon government.
4
Staying the Course
Johnson and Nixon