s taying the c ourse 211the communist menace. Equally important, Vietnam must not be
allowed to increase the risk of nuclear confrontation with a major com-
munist power or expand into a wider war against China. Circumstances
thus dictated a war limited in both goal and method: American objec-
tives would not include military victory in the classic sense of forcing
an enemy surrender or occupying the adversary’s territory, and military
measures would exclude actions deemed likely to provoke either com-
munist superpower to enter the confl ict directly.
Not everyone was persuaded of the need for the United States to
stand behind the Saigon government. A number of Western leaders
believed Saigon a hopeless case due to the endemic weakness of the
regime, its lack of popular support, and the powerful claim of the
Vietnamese communists to nationalist legitimacy. Charles de Gaulle
proposed the neutralization of Vietnam, but Johnson dismissed the idea
as too vague. At home, many Americans, including some in the mil-
itary, remembered bitterly the stalemate in Korea and insisted that
never again should the United States permit itself to be caught up in a
land war in Asia. Skeptics included Ball, Senator Mike Mansfi eld, the
majority leader, and, at times, Johnson’s confi dant Clark Cliff ord and
Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Ball repeatedly argued against direct
American military intervention. South Vietnam, he insisted, did not
represent a vital American interest, American prestige and infl uence
would be compromised by backing an unpopular military government,
escalation would beget the same by the other side, and the prospects for
success were poor. But although Johnson heard out Ball, the assistant
secretary’s voice was drowned out by the larger chorus of interven-
tionists around the president.
Th e president’s conviction that the only choice in Vietnam lay along
a narrow path between ignominious retreat and reckless escalation was
reinforced by political considerations. Even had Johnson wanted to
walk away from the confl ict, the likely political fallout would have
prevented him from doing so. To abandon Saigon or accept neutrali-
zation would have left him vulnerable to charges of weakness. He had
witnessed the damage done to the Democrats by the virulent “Who lost
China?” debate and feared a repeat. (Eisenhower had survived Castro’s
communist triumph in Cuba, but he enjoyed credibility on national
security that Johnson could not claim.) Indeed, the consequences might