s taying the c ourse 213demonstrate American fi rmness to audiences both at home and abroad.
Th e initial incident was followed by a report, later retracted, of a second
encounter. With little regard for the accuracy of the information, the
administration hurriedly prepared a resolution for Congress that would
authorize a limited military response and shared it with legislative
leaders. Enraged at the attacks, the lawmakers encouraged the adminis-
tration to broaden the wording to permit wider use of force. Th e revised
Tonkin Gulf Resolution passed both houses of Congress with minimal
opposition (two senators voted nay; there were no negative votes in the
House of Representatives). Within days American aircraft struck the
torpedo boat bases and a fuel storage facility.
Th e Tonkin Gulf incident and its aftermath played directly into the
president’s hands during the 1964 campaign. Public support was strong
for both the resolution and the administration’s measured military
response. Th rough his restrained initial use of the mandate Congress
had given him, Johnson met his immediate political needs. He demon-
strated responsible fi rmness against communist provocations. American
voters could see the striking contrast between the president’s approach
and the reckless bellicosity advocated by his 1964 Republican presi-
dential opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater.
At the same time, Johnson refrained from making any specifi c com-
mitments about future American actions in Vietnam, including pledges
not to send American troops to fi ght in foreign wars of the sort that had
haunted Roosevelt after his 1940 reelection campaign. In a speech in
late September 1964, Johnson chose his words very carefully: “I have
not thought we were ready for American boys to do the fi ghting for
Asian boys. What I have been trying to do was to get the boys in
Vietnam to do their own fi ghting—we are not going north and drop
bombs at this stage of the game.” A careful listener would have noted
that Johnson kept open every military option. The president’s deft
campaign and his foe’s extreme positions resulted in a landslide Demo-
cratic victory, including huge congressional majorities. Johnson
emerged well positioned for sweeping legislative success the following
year. If Vietnam could be contained, the Great Society appeared within
his reach.
But the war would not stay in its place. Th e downward trajectory of
the Saigon government continued through 1964 and into the following