s taying the c ourse 219Unlike Wilson and Roosevelt, Johnson did not seek to transform the
international system. He had inherited a world divided into two power
blocs, Western and communist, and would honor the American com-
mitment to prevent the latter from gaining ground. Th e American role,
then, was at its core a conservative one: to preserve the local status quo
as an expression of the larger balance of power. Johnson’s war goals were
conservative in a second critical sense, too. In sustaining the indepen-
dence of South Vietnam, his primary objective, he would take no risk
of provoking either Soviet or Chinese intervention and thus widening
the war. And so he added that American intervention sought to do only
what was “absolutely necessary” to secure South Vietnamese indepen-
dence and security. Th e United States would fi ght a war for a limited,
specifi c goal in a manner intended to avoid any danger of a general war.
The president’s expression of war goals masked several potential
problems. Johnson stated American objectives in stark, even rigid
terms. In doing so, he painted himself into a corner, a curious move for
a politician renowned for his shrewdness. By insisting absolutely on
South Vietnamese independence and ruling out withdrawal under a
political agreement, he left little space for political compromise. He also
declined to define any expectations for the South Vietnamese gov-
ernment, despite the fact that American policy makers blamed much of
the deterioration in the regime’s military fortunes on its political
failings. Th us he could not use a corrupt and inept Saigon to justify
disengagement; indeed, he gave South Vietnamese political leaders
great leverage over any possible political settlement. Political initiative
was placed largely in communist hands, too, for Johnson said the other
side would determine when peace would come.
Basing American credibility on South Vietnam represented a broader
risk, too. Success in international power politics requires strategic
fl exibility—sometimes retreat is the wiser course. Strong as America
was in the 1960s, its power was not unlimited, and its leaders under-
stood this. Th ey worried that if the United States became too deeply
enmeshed in Southeast Asia, American resources would be insuffi cient
to meet crises elsewhere. This consideration weighed on the Joint
Chiefs, who advised the president to mobilize the country fully for war,
and on key foreign leaders. All feared the United States would be less
able to meet its broad-ranging security obligations, in Western Europe,