s taying the c ourse 249the message through a new back channel opened by Henry Kissinger,
still a Harvard professor, who served as an informal conduit. The
United States also gave ground: in a speech at San Antonio in late
September 1967, Johnson off ered to stop air attacks on the DRV as a
step to initiate discussions, with the understanding that so long as talks
were under way in good faith the communists would not take advan-
tage of the cessation. Modifying its demand that Hanoi cease infi l-
tration before a bombing halt, the administration instead said North
Vietnam would have to agree merely not to increase its military eff ort.
Again, however, an increase in the intensity of the bombing campaign
suff ocated the peace feelers.
If anything, the South Vietnamese government (GVN) proved more
frustrating to the Johnson administration than did Hanoi. Despite
constant American urging to introduce reforms to improve political
stability and win popular support, South Vietnamese military leaders,
the power behind the regime, demonstrated greater concern for their
own security than for creating a workable government. Th e arrival of
American troops did not put an end to the turmoil; coup followed
coup. Generals Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Th ieu fi nally emerged
as the two offi cers with the strongest backing. At Johnson’s behest, they
agreed to draft a new constitution, with a number of American features,
and then combined in a single ticket, with Thieu at its head, in a
national election in September 1967. Despite winning just one-third of
the votes, the Th ieu-Ky ticket placed fi rst. American offi cials hailed
the results as conferring legitimacy on the government, ignoring the
fact that no candidate who advocated a coalition government with the
NLF could run. When newly elected President Th ieu proceeded to
arrest various political opponents, the American embassy had to arrange
to have them released.
Th e episode was yet another symptom of the underlying problem:
neither the United States nor the GVN trusted each other. South Viet-
namese offi cials feared an American sellout in any political settlement.
When in late 1967 Johnson raised the possibility of negotiations
between Saigon and the NLF, Th ieu rejected the idea out of hand. As if
to hammer home the point, a senior GVN police offi cial in October
1967 arrested two NLF representatives who were heading to a meeting
with U.S. embassy offi cials to discuss a prisoner exchange. To their