s taying the c ourse 253Finally, having promised “peace,” Nixon would fi nd it diffi cult to sell
full-scale mobilization to a Congress controlled by the opposition party,
especially with an overheated American economy showing serious infl a-
tionary strains.
Th e new president knew what he hoped to accomplish—withdrawal
that was not surrender—but had no clear policy to achieve it. Ideally,
the United States still would secure an independent South Vietnam
that could decide its own future. Nixon reaffi rmed this objective in a
speech on May 14, 1969, and soon thereafter in a private message to
Ho Chi Minh. But another goal was now at least as important—
extricating the United States from the confl ict. Working with his new
national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, the president expected to
pursue a diplomatic track, particularly through secret talks between
Kissinger and DRV negotiators. If Nixon and Kissinger believed they
would make quick progress toward a negotiated settlement, the fi rst
sessions with Th o and his colleagues in summer 1969 disabused them of
their optimism. Hanoi would continue to be obstinate, even when
Nixon threatened to use greater force. Other measures would be
needed to demonstrate progress toward ending the war to the American
people.
Seeking a military policy the public would accept, Nixon embraced
an idea proposed by his secretary of defense, Melvin Laird: a prompt
shift of battlefield responsibility to the ARVN and a concomitant
drawdown of U.S. forces. McNamara had fi rst broached an approach
along the same lines a couple of years earlier, but Westmoreland had
remained so fi xated on defeating the enemy with American troops that
he took no steps to turn over the fi ghting to South Vietnamese forces.
Likewise Cliff ord in 1968 anticipated that ARVN troops would assume
more of the combat burden over time. Laird thus became the third
successive defense secretary to identify the transfer of responsibility as
the path forward (and, for the United States, toward the exit door).
Now, though, the policy gained a name, “Vietnamization,” and became
offi cial, with a specifi ed withdrawal timetable for American forces.
To make it appear as though Vietnamization would not be construed
as a tacit admission the United States was abandoning its post–World
War II role as guarantor of security for small nations facing communist
aggression, the administration joined the policy to what the president