s taying the c ourse 255Taking the Gloves Off
Between January 1969 and January 1973, when a peace agreement was
fi nally signed in Paris, the United States fought in Vietnam under a
peculiar dual-command system. On one side, a relatively straightfor-
ward relationship ran from defense secretary Laird through MACV
commander Creighton Abrams to the troops in the fi eld. Th is chain of
command embodied the administration’s commitment to Vietnamiza-
tion. Over four years, as American troops withdrew, Abrams improved
pacification efforts and turned over increased responsibility to the
ARVN. Th e results made plain both the strengths of Vietnamization
and its limits. On the other side, the White House intervened fi tfully to
direct military operations, usually to meet some domestic political need
or infl uence the ongoing peace talks. Th ese episodes saw Nixon fl exing
his muscles: he unleashed military power in ways his predecessor had
not allowed, satisfying, if only briefl y, the military’s desire to be allowed
to fi ght with the gloves off. Despite short-term military benefi ts, the
results proved transient, and the spillover eff ects at home and in Indo-
china called into question the judgment behind the impulse.
Abrams reoriented American strategy, rejecting Westmoreland’s
methods and emphasis, and introducing a new approach that fi t well
with Laird’s agenda. Where Westmoreland shunned pacifi cation and
minimized the role of the ARVN, Abrams saw the handwriting on the
wall—after 1968, the United States was certain to disengage from the
war, so the survival of South Vietnam depended upon achieving more
eff ective governance and upgrading ARVN combat capability. Defeats
inflicted on VC/NVA mainforce units in the Tet Offensive and in
subsequent attacks over the following year sharply reduced the threat
from regular enemy units. With VC troops decimated, moreover, the
communist political infrastructure became vulnerable. Abrams altered
the politico-military approach to that of fi ghting “one war” designed to
improve population security: as pacifi cation established the presence
of the South Vietnamese government among the rural population,
American and ARVN troops would provide local security, shunning
search-and-destroy operations in favor of “clear-and-hold” tactics that
saw smaller units remaining in place to demonstrate government
control. Meanwhile, he stepped up training of South Vietnamese forces,