s taying the c ourse 257steadfastness extended all the way up the South Vietnamese chain of
command to the president: in the face of mounting NVA pressure,
Th ieu called off Lam Son 719 when his forces reached Tchepone in Laos
before they could destroy many enemy supplies, long before the sched-
uled end of the operation. ARVN troops gave a good account of
themselves so long as they had ample American air power behind them.
Overwhelming air strikes shielded the Laotian operation and repelled
NVA attacks in 1972. Nothing in these episodes, however, suggested
that South Vietnamese forces left on their own could withstand future
NVA off ensives. Yet as early as November 1969, Laird had informed
Congress that the administration had initiated planning for a phase
after July 1, 1973, when the United States would provide no continuing
support against either external or internal threats.
Complicating matters for Abrams, orders and instructions some-
times came directly from the president or others close to him. Nixon
centralized sensitive military decisions in the White House and the
National Security Council (NSC) under Kissinger rather than trust
them to Laird. At times Kissinger and his NSC staff , including General
Alexander Haig, went around the defense secretary to work instead
with the JCS. Four pivotal operations—the secret bombing of
Cambodia that began in early 1969; the ground incursion into
Cambodia in spring 1970; Lam Son 719; and the Linebacker bombing
campaign directed against North Vietnam in response to the 1972 NVA
off ensive—appear to have originated with the president and his imme-
diate circle of advisors, though each one refl ected long-standing mil-
itary requests to widen the scope of the war. Much as military
commanders welcomed the operations, they occurred under constraints
that dramatically lessened any military benefits they might have
produced. Th ey also generated consequences that damaged the long-
term prospects for the success of Vietnamization or American policy in
Southeast Asia.
Nixon decided soon after taking offi ce to reprise the Eisenhower
move that helped break the Korean stalemate, but with a twist moti-
vated by his desire to dampen political tensions at home. For years the
military had wanted to strike communist sanctuaries in Cambodia
by air and on the ground, a request reiterated by Abrams. Just as
Eisenhower had threatened wider strategic bombing, Nixon wanted to