t he p erils of o ptimism 289peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo as a mistake. Apart from misusing
U.S. military resources, Rumsfeld maintained, these operations
encouraged dependency on outside intervention rather than forcing
people in war-torn societies to solve their own problems. He was
adamant that the United States must foster a more rapid return to
self-suffi ciency. Th e aftermath of the operation against the Taliban in
Afghanistan represented the model he believed the United States ought
to follow: a minimal commitment of military force to police postwar
rebuilding, allies stepping in to assume much of the burden, and a
quick return to self-government under a friendly leader. Within the
military establishment, the administration’s distaste for nation building
met a positive reception.
Early Pentagon planning for post-Saddam Iraq refl ected the defense
secretary’s premises and the Afghanistan experience. Rumsfeld and
Franks focused almost exclusively on the invasion itself. Other mil-
itary planners likewise gave little thought to the postwar stability phase
(referred to as “Phase IV” in current military jargon), having been
assured initially that it would be the responsibility of other government
agencies. Civilian leaders at the Defense Department made a number
of assumptions about what would happen after the regime was over-
thrown that were based on an optimistic view of underlying conditions
in Iraq. Th e Iraqi state would continue largely intact, “under new man-
agement,” while the Iraqi economy would quickly recover and the
society would progress smoothly to a tolerant, multisectarian order. In
political terms, regime change meant a neat decapitation procedure: the
removal of the dictator and his inner circle of family members and
henchmen, followed by their replacement by democratic leaders. Any
costs incurred to rebuild the economy would be self-fi nanced as Iraq
quickly resumed pumping oil in large quantities to an eager world
energy market. As for ongoing security issues, these would be minor,
easily handed over to some combination of multinational troops and
police and reconstituted Iraqi security forces.
Within the military and other parts of the Bush administration, many
were not so sanguine. Some military planners feared that the power
vacuum created by Saddam’s ouster would encourage disorder. Expe-
rience from previous postwar stability operations suggested that security
was best assured by maintaining an adequate force-to-population ratio.