t he p erils of o ptimism 299reconciled to defeat. Meanwhile, sporadic clashes erupted between U.S.
troops and Iraqis protesting a lack of services or jobs, and the former,
not prepared to cope with civil disturbances, sometimes responded with
excessive force.
As word of the problems reached Jay Garner in Kuwait, he persuaded
Franks to allow his Offi ce of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assis-
tance to move to Baghdad ahead of CENTCOM’s timetable. But the
arrival of the small ORHA staff resolved little: it was better suited to
meet a humanitarian emergency that never arose than to restore a func-
tioning infrastructure, while the division of responsibility between the
military command and Garner’s group remained murky. Dissatisfi ed,
Rumsfeld accelerated his own schedule for establishing a full-fl edged
occupation authority. Garner learned just a few weeks after he set up
shop in Baghdad that he would be replaced by L. Paul “Jerry” Bremer
III, who would head up a new Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
Bremer regarded himself in the role of proconsul, like Douglas
MacArthur in post–World War II Japan, with a broad mandate to
remake Iraq into a liberal, democratic society. Although he knew little
about Iraq, he would make up for it through forceful leadership. He
swiftly issued several momentous orders. Recall that the American plan
for postwar Iraq, which Bush had approved, called for continuity in
governing institutions. Th us, ministry personnel, apart from the most
senior offi cials, would be retained to assure ongoing operations.
Military and civilian planners had likewise decided to keep much of the
Iraqi military to assist in restoring order quickly. Within days of his
arrival in Baghdad, Bremer discarded this framework. He concluded
that Baathist infl uence had to be eradicated root and branch, which
entailed removing any offi cial or soldier tainted by a party connection.
In his fi rst CPA order, he banned the top three layers of offi cials in
every ministry from future government employment, an exclusion that
covered as many as 85,000 people. Unfortunately, this approach did
away not just with regime loyalists but also with many experts and
technical specialists, for whom, as is often the case in one-party dicta-
torships, party membership had been a prerequisite for holding a
position of responsibility.
Worse soon followed. Bremer’s next order disbanded the Iraqi Army
and security services. In a single stroke, he destroyed the central pillar