22 e lusive v ictories
own people. Commonly called asymmetric warfare, it may be more apt
to refer to this form of confl ict as “war amongst the people,” a phrase
coined by British General Rupert Smith.
Much of the contemporary American arsenal is ill-suited for asym-
metric confl icts. High-technology weaponry can infl ict devastating
damage on identifi able hard economic and military targets, but these
are rare when guerilla forces conceal themselves among the people.
Further, when American attacks cause collateral civilian damage, espe-
cially casualties among noncombatants, popular anger against the
United States directly undermines a key political objective—boosting
support for the local regime—that a president seeks. Th e strikes by
Predator drones against suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders in Paki-
stan and Afghanistan have provoked a backlash in both countries,
weakening the legitimacy of the governments backed by the United
States. Technology may have ignited a revolution in the way the U.S.
military uses force, but thus far the application to asymmetric wars
suggests the change may be counterproductive.
Th e Recurring Challenges of Wartime Presidential Leadership
Within these contexts of continuity (the constitutional system) and
change (expanded presidential war-making capacity and the shift in the
nature of armed confl ict), wartime presidents face a recurring set of
challenges. Th e fi rst is to decide whether to go to war or to accept that
one is inevitable. For a political leader, no decision has greater conse-
quences. All wars impose costs and carry risks. Presidents must take
care, then, that they enter, provoke, or initiate war only when vital
national interests are at stake and other means for securing them have
been exhausted. Sometimes the case for war is quite clear. Apart from
unconditional pacifi sts or a few revisionists whose view was warped by
anti-Roosevelt animus, the geopolitical and moral imperative for
United States participation in World War II lies beyond question, even
prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In other instances presi-
dents have chosen war under much less compelling circumstances.
As a president considers whether to go to war, a second task arises: to
lay the foundation to wage war successfully. When confl ict approaches
or erupts, he needs to set in place the appropriate means, create the