t he p erils of o ptimism 301Iraqis, to help prepare for the return of Iraqi sovereignty, and he
announced (again without approval from the administration) that the
occupation would end on June 15, 2004. But the council operated too
much under his thumb to claim popular legitimacy, while the interim
constitution drafted by the council and the CPA vested most power in
the hands of the Shia and Kurds, leaving the Sunnis marginalized and
discontented. ^
If the CPA claimed authority to govern Iraq, moreover, it needed to
be prepared to do so effectively. Bremer’s organization lacked the
capacity to restore Iraq’s infrastructure and services. Th roughout its
existence, the CPA remained woefully understaff ed. American gov-
ernment rules preclude assigning civilian personnel in high-risk areas
without their consent, so the CPA was forced to rely on federal agency
volunteers. And with Iraq becoming more dangerous over time, these
were in short supply. Further, by comparison with many other gov-
ernments, American foreign policy personnel are disproportionately
militarized—that is, the ratio of troops to civilian diplomats and devel-
opment staff is very high. The CPA found itself depending on
political appointees, often young former Republican campaign workers
who did not speak Arabic and lacked the technical skills needed to help
run Iraq. Many of them remained ensconced in the tight security and
relative comfort of Baghdad’s Green Zone. Widely criticized for such
hires, Bremer and the CPA really had no better option. Th e authority
certainly tried, and it did register some accomplishments, but far too
few to meet Iraqis’ expectations.
Replacement at the top of the military hierarchy likewise compro-
mised the eff ectiveness of the military response to ongoing violence.
Franks, scheduled to retire shortly after the invasion, showed little
interest in its aftermath. McKiernan, too, rotated out. In a peculiar
selection that probably refl ected the conviction of the Pentagon civilian
leadership that little remained to be done in Iraq, his successor was
Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the least senior “three-star” in the
entire U.S. Army and an offi cer who had never commanded anything
larger than a division. Sanchez would prove to be a singularly poor
choice, someone who never managed to grasp the changing situation in
Iraq as the scattered violence increased in intensity. He never articulated
a coherent strategy for meeting the incipient insurgency, either, and