t he p erils of o ptimism 303occupied by a Western power. Th e Iraqi population quickly became
much cooler toward their erstwhile liberators, and, as in Vietnam, U.S.
troops found it diffi cult to distinguish friend from enemy. In turn this
led American units conducting operations, especially in Sunni areas, to
sweep up large numbers of Iraqi men suspected of being insurgents or
aiding them. As the infl ux swamped the available detention facilities
and military police, the overcrowded conditions precipitated the inevi-
table scandal: photographs from Abu Ghraib prison that showed Amer-
ican guards mistreating Iraqis appeared widely across the Middle East
and further tarnished the liberators’ sagging image.
Beneath the violence, the United States faced a complex, multisided
confl ict. Th e minority Sunni Muslims, who had dominated Iraq under
Saddam Hussein, feared and resented the shift in power to the Shiite
majority that any democratic system implied. In support of Sunni
resistance, jihadist fi ghters from around the region fl ooded across the
still-unsecured borders, establishing a terrorist organization called
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that attacked coalition forces and Shia indis-
criminately. Armed Shiite factions, notably one led by the young
cleric Muqtada al Sadr, formed their own militia groups to retaliate.
Th e Shiite militia sometimes stood down from attacking the occupying
forces but refused to disarm and periodically reopened campaigns
against them. Finally, in northern Iraq, the non-Arab Kurds, well
organized and with their own militia, threatened to declare indepen-
dence. Th ey clashed with local Arabs that Saddam Hussein had moved
into the region in his eff ort to secure control.
American eff orts to fi nd a political solution foundered on the deep
sectarian rifts. Recognizing that formal U.S. occupation stoked Iraqi
resentment, Bremer looked to restore Iraqi sovereignty at an early date
and encouraged the writing of a new constitution. In June 2004, he
turned over authority to an interim government under Prime Minister
Ayad Allawi and departed. Nonetheless, the end of the CPA did not
hasten a return of political stability. Iraqi leaders could not agree on an
acceptable power-sharing formula. Th e Bush administration put great
stock in the fi rst free elections in modern Iraqi history in January 2005,
but Sunnis organized a boycott rather than accept results that would
confi rm their minority status. Absent their participation, the new
government lacked legitimacy, and it remained under the infl uence of