306 e lusive v ictories
initial invasion planning had been fl awed. He preferred to emphasize
the occasional good news, such as the strong turnout among non-
Sunnis in Iraqi elections, over the mounting evidence of a failing
policy. Understandable though it is for a wartime leader to want to
believe all goes well, it suggests a dangerous complacency. Th e numbers
in Iraq told a grim story: total attacks rose from 26,500 in 2004 to
34,000 in 2005. Bush’s declarations of fi rmness and optimism increas-
ingly made him appear out of touch with reality. Th us in a May 2006
speech he asserted yet again that Iraq had reached a turning point and
was demonstrating that democracy was the hope of the region. Th e
claim of progress fl ew in the face of the 3,500 insurgent attacks that
month, which equaled the one-month record.
More than just a character trait seems to have been at work. Bush
believed strongly that as a wartime president he needed to set a positive
tone in diffi cult times, that he could not show doubt or lead anyone to
question his will to persevere. Th is was how he understood Winston
Churchill to have acted in Britain’s darkest days early in the Second
World War. Th e president’s attitude also stifl ed questions within the
administration about whether the war was being fought correctly and
discouraged any eff ort to fi nd alternatives, while reducing senior offi -
cials to the role of cheerleaders and marketers for current policy. A t
times, boosterism reached a point of absurdity, as when the vice pres-
ident declared in mid-2005 that the insurgency was in its last throes.
Further, although familiar with arguments in favor of active political
direction of military affairs, Bush still adhered to the notion that
Johnson had erred in micromanaging during the Vietnam War. No
matter that this was a misreading of the historical record. Bush believed
the generals and offi cials on the ground needed to be given latitude,
and he continued to practice leadership through delegation.
Ironically, in his determination to avoid Johnson’s approach, Bush
brought himself closer to his failed predecessor’s fate. Lincoln, not
Churchill, would have been a more suitable model. Th e former took a
hard look at his policies and his generals and never hesitated to make
changes, something of which Eliot Cohen apparently reminded Bush in
two face-to-face meetings in 2006. Churchill’s doggedness, by contrast,
owed more to his lack of options. Vastly overmatched by German
power until the Soviet Union and the United States entered the war, the