314 e lusive v ictories
hearts and minds.” It was a mode of warfare that looked nothing like
the high-tech military transformation Rumsfeld had promoted, calling
instead for ample numbers and ample patience.
Through summer and fall 2006, the search for an approach that
might reverse the drift toward disaster in Iraq proceeded out of sight in
Washington. If word of a strategy review leaked amid the midterm con-
gressional campaigns, it would be perceived as an admission of failure
by the administration and dishearten Republicans who still backed the
president. On the surface, then, nothing changed: Bush off ered the
same defense of his policy and his commanders as before, grasping at
straws, such as the killing of the vicious Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, head
of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Behind the scenes critical reassessment and
consideration of alternatives gained impetus. Several groups, civilian
and military, explored whether counterinsurgency methods modeled on
earlier military operations such as Tal Afar might become the foun-
dation for a broader operational initiative to “seize, hold, and build.” If
enough American troops could be made available to secure Baghdad,
success there could create a breathing space in which Iraqi leaders repre-
senting the diff erent sectarian factions could fi nally reach an acceptable
political outcome.
In time, this alternative approach would become known by the force
commitment involved—a temporary increase of 20,000 to 30,000 U.S.
troops—as “the surge.” With the military overstretched by the war and
needing to give units time to recover between deployments, no more
than fi ve brigades could be made available. Th is, too, was a conse-
quence of the decision not to mobilize for a long confl ict.
Proponents of a troop surge swam upstream against powerful
political currents within and beyond the Bush administration. Although
infl uential former offi cers such as retired Army General Jack Keane and
a cohort of counterinsurgency enthusiasts at the middle ranks of the
military hierarchy promoted the surge and “seize, hold, and build”
tactics, the Joint Chiefs did not agree. Th ese senior offi cers worried
that Iraq had damaged the military, especially the army, and saw disen-
gagement as a vital step toward restoring it. Th ey doubted whether a
modest temporary increase to 160,000 troops could accomplish what
130,000 had not been able to do in more than three years. Instead the
JCS concluded that it would be best to continue gradual withdrawal