t he p erils of o ptimism 323Th e outcome in Iraq exemplifi es the consequences of misguided
wartime leadership. Bush mishandled nearly all of the tasks a wartime
president faces. He permitted a drift into war rather than encouraging
a rigorous, balanced assessment of the intelligence about the threat
from Iraqi WMD, Saddam Hussein’s alleged ties to terrorists, and the
long-term risks of going to war. To boost public support for possible
military action, the administration hyped the potential danger that
Saddam might transfer WMD to extremists. All this produced decep-
tively high approval ratings for invading Iraq. By comparison with the
1991 Gulf War, the president and his key aides achieved disappointing
diplomatic results both before and after the invasion. Few potential
allies, for example, contributed troops to assist in the postwar occu-
pation. (And other than Great Britain, many that did attached such
tight restrictions on their forces that they were largely useless in
fighting the insurgency.) The president also failed to tend closely
enough to the planning for the invasion, which left no margin for
error if the optimistic assumptions guiding Pentagon leaders turned
out to be mistaken. Here he did not take care to make certain his war
goals, especially his sweeping vision for postwar Iraq, were refl ected in
the preparations for postwar stability operations. When things went
askew after the capture of Baghdad, Bush persisted in his version of a
corporate management style. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld continued
to disdain nation building in Iraq, even though nothing else could
assure accomplishment of the president’s peace-building agenda.
Further, in asking no sacrifi ce of the American people, the president
saw to it that they would not be invested in the war’s success. Th ey
turned against the confl ict just as it became evident that achieving
anything like what the president wanted would entail a protracted
counterinsurgency eff ort.
Even Bush’s fi nest moment—the troop-surge decision—raises ques-
tions about his leadership. It took considerable boldness to reject the
key ISG recommendations and disregard the advice of the Joint Chiefs.
Th e president did not accept the surge proposal, though, because of its
soundness. At that point in the war, little solid evidence supported the
belief that counterinsurgency methods might be successful in Iraq. Th e
decision refl ected Bush’s innate stubbornness, his willingness to grasp at
anything rather than admit defeat. Had the surge option not been on