330 e lusive v ictories
Th e Price of Buying Time
Obama moved quickly to establish firm White House control over
Afghanistan policy, and in doing so he began to set a course toward an
increased American role in the confl ict. At the time of the 2008 election,
38,000 American troops fought in Afghanistan (along with nearly
30,000 NATO and allied forces, plus Afghan security forces). General
David McKiernan, the American commander on the ground (who had
earlier led the invasion of Iraq), had asked for 30,000 reinforcements.
At Bush’s request, a strategy review had been started in summer 2008.
It pointed to a host of problems—too few troops, poor cooperation
between American military commanders and civilian offi cials in Kabul,
corruption, ineff ective performance by the Afghan Army—and con-
cluded the United States was neither winning nor losing.
Obama received the results, as well as a report from Vice President
Joe Biden, who visited Afghanistan and found U.S. troops and senior
offi cers uncertain and divided about what they were trying to accom-
plish. General David Petraeus, now elevated to command CENTCOM
and thus also responsible for Afghanistan, chimed in with a recommen-
dation that the president meet the request for more troops while he
weighed options. Obama naturally preferred not to send reinforce-
ments until he completed his own evaluation, but events forced his
hand. The Afghan election scheduled for August 2009 might be
disrupted by insurgent violence unless order could be improved, which
might in turn fracture the country. In mid-February 2009, less than a
month after taking offi ce, Obama decided to send 17,000 more troops
to Afghanistan. As Bob Woodward notes, the president really had only
one option, because he could not aff ord to see the election swamped by
chaos and bloodshed. From that point onward, disengagement in the
short run would never be on the table.
Th e president took a second early step to put his stamp on the war. In
May he replaced McKiernan with General Stanley McChrystal.
Although the decision refl ected a recommendation from defense sec-
retary Robert Gates (who continued in the position to which he had
been appointed by Bush at the time of the Iraq surge) and Admiral Mike
Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , the initial impetus for the
move came from retired U.S. Army General Jack Keane. Keane had