334 e lusive v ictories
to keep schools open, and more. American diplomats had tried every-
thing from soothing words to blunt threats to infl uence the Afghan
president, all to no avail. As in Saigon a generation earlier or Baghdad
more recently, the head of the client regime has his own interests and
pursues them doggedly. Karzai sought to shore up his political base,
appointing governors and other offi cials whose loyalty he purchased by
letting them enrich themselves without interference. COIN tactics
depend on the capacity of the local government to meet the needs of the
populace, and nothing suggested that the regime in Kabul would do so
any better than it had in the past. Th e American ambassador in Kabul,
General Karl Eikenberry (a former commander of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan), concluded that Karzai was a hopeless case.
Relations with Pakistan were no better, and indeed these seemed to
lie at the heart of the problem. Certain border regions of Pakistan, espe-
cially the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), have never been
under eff ective control by the Islamabad government. Populated by the
same ethnic group (Pashtun) that constitutes the core of the Taliban,
the FATA off ered a haven to retreating Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders
after 2001. Th ey continued to operate from the FATA and other friendly
territory just inside Pakistan, despite the increased tempo of U.S. drone
attacks and CIA raids. As the United States learned in Vietnam, it is
almost impossible to defeat insurgents who can choose when to enter
and exit the battle zone and can recover in relative safety. With Pakistan
a notional ally in the war on terror and the recipient of substantial mil-
itary assistance since 9/11, the United States had to respect Pakistani
sovereignty. Pakistan might ignore drone strikes, contenting itself with
a diplomatic protest when these caused civilian deaths, but American
and Afghan forces could not carry the war onto Pakistani soil. Most
disturbing, the United States amassed evidence that the Pakistani intel-
ligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI),
continued to give important logistical support to both the Taliban and
al-Qaeda. So far as some elements within the Pakistani state were
concerned, Pakistan had its own security interests in Afghanistan, in
particular that of off setting the rise in Indian infl uence in Kabul. American
offi cials believed that current and/or former senior Pakistani military
and ISI leaders were alerting Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives to
pending U.S. attacks. Absent a change in Pakistani behavior, which