Elusive Victories_ The American Presidency at War-Oxford University Press (2012)

(Axel Boer) #1
c onclusion 349

A fourth puzzle is why wartime presidents, even those elected by
huge margins, suffer the defeat of their domestic agenda and the
undoing of their reform aspirations. Johnson entered the Vietnam War
with the most sweeping program, intending through his Great Society
to outdo even the New Deal, only to see his program derailed by late



  1. An argument can be made that both Wilson and Roosevelt had
    fi nished their domestic projects before embarking on war, but certainly
    their supporters believed otherwise. Most Progressives enthusiastically
    participated in the mobilization effort in 1917–1918 because they
    regarded their activities as of a piece with earlier social reforms, and
    Wilson did nothing to disabuse them of this notion. Roosevelt
    continued to speak the language of the New Deal during the Second
    World War. Notwithstanding his claim that Dr. New Deal had passed
    the torch to Dr. Win-the-War, his Four Freedoms invoked New Deal
    themes and his 1944 opening campaign speech promised to take gov-
    ernment promotion of economic prosperity and security to new
    lengths. New Dealers expected reform to defi ne the postwar era and
    used agencies such as the National Resources Planning Board to set the
    stage accordingly. Bush sought to pursue his agenda of reducing the
    scale of government while the United States fought wars in Afghanistan
    and Iraq.
    Yet presidents have seen their domestic initiatives unravel amid mil-
    itary confl ict. One partial explanation lies in the cost of war and the
    competition for scarce resources. Lincoln capitalized on fi scal circum-
    stances that did not recur under his wartime successors. Key elements
    of the Civil War Republican program, such as the homesteading law,
    called for no direct federal expenditures, so they did not compete for
    funding with the war. Where presidential domestic agendas come with
    a price tag, however, programs may be crowded out by military outlays.
    Yet cost alone does not suffi ce to account for the exhaustion of reform
    energy. Several confl icts have occurred in periods of rapid economic
    growth; indeed, the wars themselves have stimulated that economic
    expansion. World War II stands out because military expenditures
    fi nally lifted the economy out of the Great Depression, but the wars in
    Vietnam and Iraq were also accompanied by a robust economy. In the
    latter case, the American economy was suffi ciently strong that policy
    makers decided they could aff ord to retain the massive tax cuts that had

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