Elusive Victories_ The American Presidency at War-Oxford University Press (2012)

notes to pages 174‒179 397

146. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 135–36; Roberts, Masters and Commanders ,


147. 
     


148. Emerson, “Franklin Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief in World War II,”
     198–99; Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 327–28.


149. Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 336.


150. Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 370.


151. Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 410–11, 428.


152. Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 411.


153. Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 492.


154. Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 359.


155. Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 359–60, 370–71; Kennedy, Freedom
     from Fear , 610–11.


156. Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 428.


157. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 149; Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 453.


158. Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 401.


159. Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 451. Th e president’s new hard line
     stung the prime minister. Rather abruptly, as the Anglo-American balance
     of power swung toward the United States, the relationship between
     Roosevelt and Churchill cooled. What had appeared an unusual personal
     friendship among leaders of two world powers stood revealed as a political
     marriage of convenience.


160. Emerson, “Franklin Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief in World War II,”
     193–94; Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 16.


161. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 240ff.


162. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , chap. 5.


163. Th e increased resources for the Pacifi c war refl ected an inter-Allied
     agreement at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 to allocate 30
     percent of the American war eff ort to the struggle against Japan. Th is
     refl ected King’s belief that by devoting too little to the Pacifi c, the United
     States risked allowing the Japanese to consolidate their gains in a way that
     would make the cost of ejecting them prohibitive. Kennedy, Freedom from
     Fear , 587; Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 187.


164. King initiated the two-axis strategy, over MacArthur’s objections; the
     general believed his should be the sole line of attack, with all military
     resources under his direction. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 342.


165. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 189ff.


166. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 344.


167. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 343–46.


168. Max Hastings, Retribution: Th e Battle for Japan, 1944–45 (New York:
     Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 24–31 ; Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 346.


169. Hastings, Retribution , 31; Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 348–50.


170. Hastings, Retribution , 219–21; Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 542.


171. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 553.