Villa, “U.S. Army, Unconditional Surrender, and Potsdam Proclamation,”
75–77.
Military opinion began to turn against the need for Soviet entry into
the war against Japan after Yalta, with Admiral King advising Truman
that the war could be won without Soviet help. Larrabee, Commander in
Chief , 202.
Villa, “U.S. Army, Unconditional Surrender, and Potsdam Proclamation,”
90–91.
Kimball, Juggler , 149, 152–53.
Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 577–78.
Lukas Haynes and Michael Ignatieff , “Mobilizing Public Support for
the United Nations: A Case Study of State Department Leadership in
Building Public and Congressional Support for a Leading U.S. Role in
International Organization, 1944–1945,” Center for Public Leadership
Working Papers , Harvard University, 2003.
Th is is the term Kimball prefers. Kimball, Juggler , 93–94.
Haynes and Ignatieff , “Mobilizing Public Support for the United
Nations.”
Haynes and Ignatieff , “Mobilizing Public Support for the United
Nations,” 71.
Kennedy, Freedom from Fear , 854–55.
Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 346–47.
Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in
Wartime (New York: Anchor Books/Random House, 2002) , chap. 4.
Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 411.
Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 635–36. For a full discussion of Churchill’s
responsibility for postwar British decline, see Peter Clarke, Th e Last Th ou-
sand Days of the British Empire: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Birth of Pax
Americana (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008).
Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 495–96.
Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 565–66. Churchill later claimed that
had the Anglo-Americans advanced into the future Soviet zone and
refused to withdraw according to the agreement, Stalin would have been
forced to renegotiate the zone boundary. But the Soviets would have
had no incentive to do so, particularly since the United States and Great
Britain still wanted the Red Army to join the war against Japan. Larrabee,
Commander in Chief , 496.
Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 3.
Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 410–11.
Importantly, too, Churchill and Roosevelt exercised diff erent authority
over their respective militaries. Th e president could issue an order and
expect it to be obeyed, but the prime minister did not hold a position in
the formal military chain of command. So he resorted to browbeating his
military commanders. See Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 14–15.
