One noteworthy exception was Marine Major General Gregory S. New-
bold, who resigned in protest against the invasion but remained quiet
about his decision.
Ricks, Fiasco , 22.
Among the Iraqi exiles touting information about Saddam Hussein’s
WMD and terrorist connections was Ahmed Chalabi, who would
continue to fi nd favor with Wolfowitz and other Defense Department
offi cials until after the invasion. See Ricks, Fiasco , 56–57.
Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 127. On the general infl ation of the Iraqi
threat by the administration, see Chaim Kaufmann, “Th reat Infl ation
and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: Th e Selling of the Iraq War,”
International Security 29 (1) (Summer 2004): 5–48.
Kaufmann, “Th reat Infl ation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas,”
39–40; Badie, “Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on Terror,” 287, 289. For
an insider’s perspective on the misuse of intelligence, see Paul R. Pillar,
“Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” Foreign Aff airs 85 (2) (March/
April 2006): 15–27.
Hess, Presidential Decisions for War , 2nd ed., 232–33.
New York Times , June 1, 2002. For a discussion, see Hess, Presidential
Decisions for War , 2nd ed., 232–33.
Ricks, Fiasco , 49, 51, 58–59, 61.
Kaufmann, “Th reat Infl ation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas,”
20–25, 37, 43–44.
In late 2002, polls showed 70 percent to 90 percent of Americans believed
Saddam would attack the US with WMD at some point, and more than
95 percent believed he was stockpiling such weapons. Kaufmann, “Th reat
Infl ation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas,” 30. On the impact
of “one-sided information fl ow,” see John R. Zaller, Th e Nature and Ori-
gins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 1995),
chap. 6.
Th ese were not declassifi ed until after the 2003 invasion. Gordon and
Trainor, Cobra II , 128–29; Kaufmann, “Th reat Infl ation and the Failure of
the Marketplace of Ideas,” 37–38; Ricks, Fiasco , 52–55, 61.
Th e House voted to authorize the use of force, 296 to 133, on October
10, 2002, and the Senate approved the resolution the following day, 77 to
23. Some of the Democratic presidential aspirants who supported the au-
thorization resolution contended that they had done so only to enhance
the president’s diplomatic leverage at the United Nations. Gordon and
Trainor, Cobra II , 130. But the congressional resolution explicitly empow-
ered the president to use force if necessary. On the Democrats’ concern
about their vulnerability on national security issues and Bush’s timing of
the authorization vote, see Hess, Presidential Decisions for War , 2nd ed.,
235–36, 239–43.
