l incoln’s s hadow 59
allowed themselves to be defeated in detail. Davis also refused to
abandon any territory willingly—a refl ection of his conviction that
Confederate nationalism was too weak—making strategic concen-
tration impossible.
Compounding the strategic problem were Davis’s abysmal choices of
fi eld commanders. Here his conventionality often asserted itself, as he
remained wedded to the principle of seniority long after it outlived its
usefulness. Having selected a handful of high-ranking generals in 1861,
he continued to rely upon the same small group of offi cers, regardless
of their performance. (I noted earlier that seniority mattered in the
Union Army, too, but the pool of generals holding equal rank and even
common date of appointment was much larger.) Th us he repeatedly
restored General Joseph E. Johnston to critical commands despite a
virtually unbroken record of caution and indecision. Davis also let
himself be guided by his perception of particular offi cers dating back to
his earlier career in the military or his tenure as secretary of war. Some-
times, as in the case of Sidney Johnston or John C. Pemberton (the
ill-fated commander at Vicksburg), Davis’s assessment had no foun-
dation in the offi cer’s prewar career performance.
To the Confederate president, moreover, fidelity to the cause of
southern independence mattered greatly, and he had no patience with
those who seemed more concerned with their own reputation or
advancement. Contrast this attitude with Lincoln’s tolerance for
common emotions such as ambition. In one famous case, Lincoln
selected Joseph Hooker to command the Army of the Potomac even
after hearing that the general believed a dictator should seize power in
Washington. Bring us victory, Lincoln wrote to Hooker, and I will
accept the risk of dictatorship. Most fatally, Davis retained in
command certain offi cers long after it became clear that they could not
lead eff ectively. In the Army of Tennessee, the principal western fi eld
force, most of the senior offi cers turned against Lieutenant General
Braxton Bragg by late 1862, even refusing to obey his orders during
battles.Yet Davis kept him in place through the disastrous Confederate
defeat at Chattanooga in November 1863.
In the end, the Confederacy probably came closest to victory when
it pursued defense in depth in 1864 not by Davis’s design so much as in
spite of it. Union war weariness mounted that summer in the face of