90 e lusive v ictories
submarine attacks, handing Wilson what appeared to be a major diplo-
matic victory.
Yet the terms under which the president resolved the immediate
crisis shifted the initiative to German hands. Wilson warned that if
Germany resumed submarine warfare on American vessels, the United
States would be forced to declare war. Th is left the policy decision to
the German government—it might choose to resume the attacks at a
moment when these would be of greatest advantage. Still worse, the
United States might be propelled into the war by the unsanctioned
decision of a random U-boat commander who decided to fi re his tor-
pedoes at a passing merchant ship caught in the crosshairs of his peri-
scope. As Wilson himself put it, “Any little German lieutenant can put
us into the war at any time by some calculated outrage.” Th is prospect
suffi ciently alarmed Secretary of State Bryan that he resigned from the
cabinet (to be replaced by Lansing, who was of course anything but
neutral). Events would show that the Germans realized the discretion
Wilson had given them. German civilian and military leaders argued
over whether the benefi ts of unrestricted submarine attacks outweighed
the risks, with the former initially persuading the Kaiser that the danger
from provoking the United States to enter the war was too great. B u t
his decision could be reversed if the players in Berlin and/or their cal-
culations changed.
Even as Wilson sought to safeguard American economic interests in
the short run, the war also presented him with what he soon saw as a
rare opportunity to reshape the international order. As noted, he had
been deeply shocked when the war started. Very much the product of
the Victorian years of peace among major nations, he believed civili-
zation had advanced to a point that ought to allow for the resolution of
diff erences by nonviolent means. He also subscribed to the Progressive
confi dence in the power of reason to overcome all problems. As the
carnage in Europe worsened, Wilson became determined to prevent
any recurrence. During the fi rst thirty-plus months of the war, the pres-
ident repeatedly sought to use his good offi ces to bring about a peace
accord. He pursued this objective through his personal direction of
American diplomacy, sending his advisor Colonel Edward M. House to
Europe on several occasions and remaining in close contact with him.
After defusing the immediate crisis with Germany over the Lusitania ,