Thursday20 February 2020 ★ FINANCIAL TIMES 9
Opinion
I
f only the US were more bitterly
divided along partisan lines. Oh, for
some rancour in Washington.
Before you check on this column-
ist’s health, compare the words of
Republicans and Democrats at the
Munich Security Conference ast week.l
From defence secretary Mark Esper
there was certainty about China’s threat
to the west and Europe’s naivety in the
face of it. From Nancy Pelosi, the
speaker of the House of Representa-
tives: certainty about China’s threat to
the west, and Europe’s naivety in the
face of it.
The US has entered anopen-ended
feud gainst the world’s largest nationa
with less debate than it musters for the
pettiest domestic affairs. Its two great
parties diverge on the weapons of
choice. They maul each other over the
wisdom of tariffs and subsidies. On the
basic rightness of the conflict, though,
the lack of dissent will strike genera-
tions to come as eccentric (and, if things
get out of hand, remiss).
By now, Europeans and other third-
parties to the superpower tussle know
that America will not soften its line
under a new president. What they tend
to underrate is the chance that it will
actually harden. For all his militant jin-
goism, PresidentDonald Trump iewsv
China in practical terms. The more
power, security and wealth that it
accrues, the less he believes there is for
the US. It is an impoverished idea of for-
eign relations but it is at least
transactional.
As proof, the Chinese can and often do
buy off some of his animus with mate-
rial concessions. Mr Trump’s quarrel is
not a principled one with the essential
nature of their government. In that
sense, his cynicism, so unbecoming in
other contexts, is a stabilising influence
on this fraughtest of relationships.
It is idealism that has the far messier
potential. Republicans were given to it
until the rout of the neo-conservatives.
It is now the Democrats whose griev-
ances with China go well beyond eco-
nomics to its civic and social model. One
presidential contender, Bernie Sanders,
views Beijing as part of an “authoritar-
ian axis”. The lesson of its awesome rise
— fears another,Elizabeth Warren —is
that “economic gains legitimise
oppression”.
As forHuawei’s role in Europe, to let it
build 5G networks would be “to choose
autocracy over democracy,” says Ms
Pelosi, with the Manichean crudeness
that nothing — not even the fiasco of
Iraq, which it helped to beget — can kill
off in Washington. Light and dark, good
and bad, free and unfree: this stuff still
trips off the tongue.
The trouble is that it also widens the
scope of the conflict beyond toy imports
and intellectual property law. It implies
that, absent a round of glasnost, there is
not much China can do to answer US
concerns. Its very system is the
problem.
The Democrats will not fret quite as
much as Mr Trump about the bilateral
trade deficit, and for this nod to Ricard-
ian logic we must be thankful. But they
seem more likely to define the US
against the Chinese way of life: to moral-
ise what is for now a largely material
conflict. No doubt, it will be meant well.
But then no one “had better motives for
all the trouble he caused” than Pyle, the
erring innocent in Graham Greene’s
novelThe Quiet American.
An odd thought, I know, that a belli-
cose president, the one who began the
US-China schism in the first place,
might be better at containing it than his
higher-minded successors. But the cold
war also metastasised beyond the plans
of those (including the diplomat George
Kennan) who never envisaged a world-
wide clash of “values”.
Mr Trump’s indifference to the
domestic doings of China, Saudi Arabia
and other governments has shown his
narrowness of human sympathy. But it
has also kept his squabbles with most of
them to what is tangible and negotiable.
It is not even as though he drives the
hardest of bargains, as the North Kore-
ans might testify between Cheshire Cat
smiles.
Perhaps the Democrats’ more ideo-
logical noises will turn out to be so much
electioneering. Neatly, their line on
China allows them to match Mr Trump
for vigilance without forfeiting their dis-
tinctiveness. It is just that Washington’s
vein of idealism is too persistent and too
chequered in its record to be dismissed
as easily as that.
A new president would need staff and
these would come from a diplomatic fir-
mament that hews to much of what the
Democrats are saying. The same belief
in America as an “idea”. The same wari-
ness of China as the opposite of it. And
the same affront that nations from Brit-
ain to the Philippines, without a market
of $21tn to fall back on, do not see things
with such piercing clarity.
[email protected]
Trump’s quarrel with
Beijing is not a principled
one with the essential
nature of its government
How a Democrat might worsen the US-China feud
Pre-eminence breeds complacency,
as the cases ofGE nda Boeing aveh
shown. Better to be a challenger, as long
as your business is financially robust.
“For too long we were in denial about
being a bank,” said one insider. No
longer. Running savings accounts and
lending to smallonline vendors ouldc
turn into a decent business. Meanwhile,
big branch networks will handicap
rivals if retail banking digitises heavily.
Mr Solomon’s task is to make a busi-
ness that once reeked of entitlement feel
like a scrappy outsider. That should be
easier than it seems. Such quirks as call-
ing support staff“the federation” ug-s
gest an institution as imbued with elite
history as Eton College. Instead, Gold-
man only elbowed its way into Wall
Street’s front rank in the 1970s.
Goldman executives now have reason
to hustle hard again. The laughter of
rivals will only matter if it persists. For
the moment it is Mr Solomon’s greatest
asset in motivating his staff.
[email protected]
carps one critic. It is pushing into areas
such aspersonal banking, here it is aw
minnow to such leviathans asBank of
America nd Chase.a
Goldman’s influence engine is also
losing traction. Alumni are either going
or gone from the top jobs at the US’s
National Economic Council, the Euro-
pean Central Bank and the Bank of Eng-
land. The book that former Goldman
CEOHenry Paulson wrote about his
campaign to cosy up to China’s authori-
tarian leaders reads queasily these days.
But so does the “vampire squid” meta-
phor. For caricaturists, interfering
octopi have personified communism,
colonialism — and Jewish-founded busi-
nesses like Goldman, against which hate
has proliferated this decade.
Such bigotry is wholly despicable. But
there is less to deplore in Goldman’s loss
of status on Wall Street, even for its
executives. If the business had truly
been able to manipulate capitalism’s
casino rules, it would not be languish-
ing. Instead, it has been prosaically
handicapped by post-crisis curbs.
Goldman has an enviable lead in cor-
porate finance advice, where contacts
are vital. The bank topped league tables
for handling takeovers and US flotations
compiled by Dealogic last year. It has a
strong position in technology deals. Last
week, tech bros flocked to Goldman’s
annual San Francisco conference at the
swanky Palace Hotel. “It’s a super-excit-
ing time for engineers at the firm,” said
co-chief information officer George Lee.
An affinity with Silicon Valley, and a
big fund management arm, are not
enough to save Goldman from an igno-
miniously low share rating.JPMorgan
Chase, which has hefty scale in retail,
commercial and investment banking, is
rated twice as highly. Goldman’sdiversi-
fication strategy s “spray and pray”,i
rents from asset bubbles, the common
pursuits of bankers for centuries. More-
over, Mr Taibbi’s fear that nothing
would change has been proved wrong.
Regulated lenders, which was what
Goldman became in 2008, have since
paid a penalty for any bailouts they
received. Ever-rising balance sheet buff-
ers are the reason Goldman’s securities
trading business now drags on returns.
Goldman has the smallest market worth
of its peers. But critics still equate it with
global capital: omnipresent, calculating,
amoral. The downside to that became
clear in 2016 when British MPs ubliclyp
roasted Michael“Woody” Sherwood,
Goldman’s most prominent British boss.
His involvement inPhilip Green’s con-
troversial sale of failing retailerBHS adh
been peripheral, but he ended up step-
ping down all the same.
More damagingly,Tim Leissner,
another former partner, pleaded guilty
in 2018 to helping fixerJho Low oot bil-l
lions from1MDB, a Malaysian wealth
fund. While there is no suggestion of
wrongdoing by Goldman, both cases
reinforced suspicions its bankers
depend on connections to make money.
In fact, all bankers seek to win fran-
chises and befriend the powerful. A leg-
acy of partnership gives Goldman exec-
utives a special advantage. The group
became a quoted company in 1999, but
it still appoints a privileged tier of “part-
ners”. After a decade or so of elite toil,
many take prestigious external jobs.
They constitute an influence network as
formidable as McKinsey’s.
L
aughter. You could hear it
above the noise of traffic in
Manhattan last month.Gold-
man Sachs ad sweated bul-h
lets to deliver itsfirst ever
investor day. Rival bankers were tick-
led, not terrified. “Is that all they’ve
got?” chuckled one. Thepitch, ed byl
chief executiveDavid Solomon, was as
slick as any Apple product launch. But
the modesty of ambition — for group
earnings to exceed capital costs by a few
percentage points — signalled how
badly the bank’s fortunes have waned.
In the noughties, Goldman Sachs fig-
ured as the world’s most powerful
investment bank. Heads of state
courted its bosses. Its share rating was
stratospheric. During the financial cri-
sis, hostility supplanted awe. The bank
was “a great vampire squid, wrapped
around the face of humanity”, raged
Rolling Stone ournalist Matt Taibbi.j
The piece could have been written by
Hunter S Thompson, if the gonzo jour-
nalist had been taking economics
classes, not acid. But, like its subject, Mr
Taibbi’s polemic has not aged well. It
implied that Goldman was special in its
ardour for networking and skimming
The humbling
of Goldman
Sachs
An infamous description of
the powerful bank as
‘a great vampire squid’
has not aged well
A
round the world, public
media institutions are con-
sidered the most trusted
sources of news in their
respective countries. But
something worrisome is afoot.
As chair of the newly formed Global
Task Force for Public Media, I am
alarmed by how quickly the tide of pub-
lic opinion can turn for institutions like
mine in Canada, and others in Britain,
Australia and Denmark.
The UK government has questioned
the BBC’s impartiality andthe spectre
has been raised of scrapping he televi-t
sion licence fee that British households
pay as the broadcaster has announced
job cuts as part of savings drivea.
Last year, Australian policeraided the
offices of the ABC, purportedly seeking
evidence gathered by the state broad-
caster relating to the national security
activities of the country’s special forces
in Afghanistan. In 2018, the Danish pub-
lic broadcaster DR announced 400 job
losses, and the closure of three of its tele-
vision channels and three radio stations,
as part of a package of reforms that cut
its budget by up to 20 per cent.While all
of us accept that public organisations
created 80 years ago warrant moderni-
sation, we should proceed with caution.
My own organisation, CBC/Radio-
Canada, is lucky that support from
many stakeholders, including govern-
ment, is holding firm. We operate on the
same principles as many of our counter-
parts: clear journalistic independence
from government, a mix of public and
private funding and a mandate to
inform, enlighten and entertain.
We, too, are “under review”, with the
release of areport ast month on the leg-l
islative framework governing Canada’s
broadcasting and telecoms sectors, and
upcoming public hearings on the
renewal of our TV and radio licences. In
these reviews, we will defend public
service media and the critical role we
play in a healthy democracy.
CBC/Radio-Canada operates a media
business across six time zones, in two
official languages (English and French)
and eight indigenous languages, deliver-
ing services on TV and radio, as well as a
full slate of digital services — all this at a
cost of the equivalent of $25 annually
per Canadian, less than most of our
peers around the globe. Yet there is
mounting debate about our raison
d’être. Critics say that with state funding
comes political meddling — despite the
robust safeguards in our journalistic
standards and practices.
Our public funding and commercial
revenue provoke the ire of private
organisations, which are suffering the
pressures of an industry that is under-
going existential disruption.
But competition between domestic
players is not the problem. In Canada,
our digital advertising revenue accounts
forless than 1 per cent f the total mar-o
ket;Google nda Facebook ogethert
account for78 per cent. Another chal-
lenge comes from foreign original con-
tent, which next year is expected to sur-
pass the$120bn pent in 2019. Ours
annual programming budget s less thani
$265m.
The real issue is the galloping, unreg-
ulated invasion of the digital giants — as
Tony Hall at the BBC nd Delphinea
Ernotte at France Télévisions have
pointed out. And he true challenge tot
our democracies is the impact of the
internet and social media driving public
discourse on platforms that are opti-
mised for commercial purposes.
So, how do we secure a safe public
space for civil civic exchange? How do
we secure a place for fact-based argu-
ment, for science, for enlightenment?
I hope we pause and reflect on how we
can bring public service to the internet,
that we consider what is at risk: non-
partisan, validated, fact-checked infor-
mation.
Imagine the alternative: a world
where the interests of under-repre-
sented communities have no place, and
where the voices of minorities are extin-
guished once and for all. That would be a
world without public service media.
The writer is president and CEO of Canada’s
national public broadcaster
A world without
public service
media would be
a darker place
The galloping, unregulated
invasion of digital giants is
the true challenge to
our democracies
Catherine
Tait
AMERICA
Janan
Ganesh
D
iscussion of the nextEU
budget s one of thei biggest
and most contentious issues
currently faced by the bloc.
Negotiating a budget deal is
not a purely arithmetical exercise.
Rather, it must be a translation of
political priorities into a financial
framework.
Most member states acknowledge
that there are a growing number of chal-
lenges for the EU. However, significant
disparities between member states and
regions persist. Therefore, a majority of
members favours setting an ambitious
level for the next multiannual financial
framework, which will cover the period
2021 to 2027. The current MFF, at 1.
per cent of the EU’s gross national
income, should be a starting point for
the negotiations. But it is clear that
lowering spending would mean weak-
ening the European project.
The EU budget is closely linked to the
functioning of the single market. Data
show that the relationship between
gross contributions of member states to
the budget and the benefits that accrue
to them from the single market is
significant.
This means that focusing onnet
balances whether countries pay in(
more than they receive) when consider-
ing the EU budget is misleading, as it
does not reflect the true benefits and
costs of integration.
For instance, between 2010 and 2016,
the so-calledVisegrad Four countries
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Slovakia) received funds amount-
ing, net, to between 1.5 and 4 per cent of
their gross domestic product. Mean-
while, the outflow of dividends and
income from property to investors
based in the EU15 (states that were
members of the bloc before May 2004)
amounted to between 4 and 8 per cent
of GDP. The single market lifted trade
barriers and opened access to central
and eastern European markets.
We need to communicate the benefits
of economic integration better. Empha-
sising net balances threatens to
exacerbate anti-EU sentiment in some
northern European member states.
We should also show how cohesion
policy benefits net contributors to the
budget. The implementation of the
2007 to 2013 cohesion policy n thei
Visegrad countries was worth€96bn ni
increased exports, and direct capital
benefits to the EU15, including €23bn
for the “frugal four” of Austria, Den-
mark, the Netherlands and Sweden.
The EU budget should not be
regarded as a financial burden, but
rather as an investment tool that has the
very important macroeconomic
function of stabilising investments
during a crisis.
A budget has to be fair and balanced.
Therefore, the costs related to Brexit
and other challenges should be more
equitably distributed. Deep cuts to both
the cohesion policy and the Common
Agricultural Policy, for instance, cannot
be justified. The burden of such cuts
falls disproportionately on poorer coun-
tries in eastern Europe.
“Equal pay for equal work” should be
the basic principle of the CAP. It should
lead to convergence of direct payments,
which currently serve as remuneration
to farmers for the delivery of public
goods and production at higher
standards than those that obtain
outside the bloc.
Apart from stimulating convergence,
cohesion policy and the CAP also
effectively address many of the new
challenges faced by the EU, especially
the transition to a low-carbon economy.
One also has to bear in mind that the
blocpursues a liberal trade agenda. If it
wants to continue with this approach,
which is the target of considerable
criticism, we need to be able to offer our
farmers and consumers some measure
of security.
Any changes to the financing of the
EU budget must not result in higher
burdens on citizens in the less devel-
oped countries. On the contrary, the
focus should fall on sectors that benefit
the most from the single market.
Attention should therefore be given to
the following proposals: a financial
transactions tax; a digital tax; a single
market levy;and an aviation fee (which
is also progressive).
In 2017, theVAT gap —the difference
between expected revenue and the
amount collected — was €137.5bn.
Member states are losing billions of
euros in VAT revenues. In Poland, by
contrast, the VAT gapdecreased yb
around 10 per cent between 2015 and
- Poland is ready to share its exper-
tise on how to create additional fiscal
capacity in order to finance an ambi-
tious EU budget.
If savings are required, we should look
at reducing increases on administra-
tion, defence and Horizon Europe, the
European Commission’s research and
innovation programme.
We should be more ambitious about
the size of the next MFF in order to
address a range of priorities. A strong,
safe and prosperous Europe requires
proper financing. We simply cannot
afford to spend less.
The writer is prime minister of Poland
Focusing on net balances
is misleading and does not
reflect the true benefits
and costs of integration
Setting an EU budget is about more than arithmetic
Mateusz
Morawiecki
FINANCE
Jonathan
Guthrie
FEBRUARY 20 2020 Section:Features Time: 19/2/2020- 18:07 User:alistair.hayes Page Name:COMMENT USA, Part,Page,Edition:USA, 9, 1