F1 Racing - UK (2020-07)

More significantly, fewteams haveever been so much better than their rivals as Williams was in 1992, as it hit a seam of form thatwou ld make it the driving force of the decade. Out ofthe 20 world titles for constructors and drivers available in the 1990s, Williams would claim nine, McLaren seven, Benetton three and Ferrari just one. By nowwell established as a Formula 1 superpower, the ¿nal year of the 180s marked the next step for Williams, as the stability of a symbiotic partnership with Renault shot it through the next nine seasons. At thesame time, years of investment, hard work and canny recruitment allowed Williams to harness a raft oftechn ologies that would change the game, to the pointwhere the governing body outlawed it all. On the one hand, that hurt after so much grind tounlock F1’s perennial quest forthe ‘unfair advantage’; on the other, it was the ultimate compliment. Williams had simply become too good. The source of thatswee t status can be traced all the way back to 184, when brake and clutch specialist AP approached Williams with an active ride system it had originally developed for road cars. Patrick Head charged hisdeput y Frank Dern ie with responsibility for a project that would initially run in an ):0, the team’s ungainly ¿rst

Honda-powered contender, in the winter of 18. But Williams had a lot on its plate in the mid- 180s, as the Honda partnership began to bear fruit. ,t took until 18 for the active ride system to be deeme d ready for an FW11. The original target was to simply improve an F1 car’s ride and allow for softer suspension settings, but by now the penny had dropped that aerodynamic load distribution was the most signi¿cant gain. Always alert to atechni cal advantage, Nelson Piquet embraced the concept and took on testing duties, while team-mate Nigel Mansell – still haunted by unhappy active ride experimentsduring his time at Lotus – showed little interest. Piquet would give the system a winning debut at Monza that season, beating an ‘active’ Lotus driven by Ayrton Senna, but subsequent testson bumpier circuits highlighted its imperfections, including a tendency to generate ‘bounce’ in faster corners. It was dropped, for now. 7he following ):12 for 188 was the ¿rst :illiams designed speci¿cally as an active ride )1 car, as the teamexplored methods to grab back performance after the loss of Honda’s all-powerful turbo V6 for a humble normally aspirated Judd

But again the system’s imperfections made
it troublesome and by the British Grand Prix –

THE HISTORYOF WILLIAMSPART 3

PatresedivesinsideBoutseninAustraliain1989. BoutsenwonthatracebutPatresewasthe best-placedWilliamsdriverinthepoints,inthird

TEN RACE VI CTORIES,

SIX TEAM ONE-TWOS,

15 OUT OF 16 POLE

POSITIONS ANDA

CAR THAT LED84%

OF THE SEASON’S LAPS.

THERE AREOTHER EXAMPLES

THAT EXCEED SUCH

STATISTICAL DOMINANCE,

BUT NOT MANY...

More significantly, fewteams haveever been so much better than their rivals as Williams was in 1992, as it hit a seam of form thatwou ld make it the driving force of the decade. Out ofthe 20 world titles for constructors and drivers available in the 1990s, Williams would claim nine, McLaren seven, Benetton three and Ferrari just one. By nowwell established as a Formula 1 superpower, the final year of the 1980s marked the next step for Williams, as the stability of a symbiotic partnership with Renault shot it through the next nine seasons. At thesame time, years of investment, hard work and canny recruitment allowed Williams to harness a raft oftechn ologies that would change the game, to the pointwhere the governing body outlawed it all. On the one hand, that hurt after so much grind tounlock F1’s perennial quest forthe ‘unfair advantage’; on the other, it was the ultimate compliment. Williams had simply become too good. The source of thatswee t status can be traced all the way back to 1984, when brake and clutch specialist AP approached Williams with an active ride system it had originally developed for road cars. Patrick Head charged hisdeput y Frank Dern ie with responsibility for a project that would initially run in an FW09, the team’s ungainly first

Honda-powered contender, in the winter of 1985. But Williams had a lot on its plate in the mid- 1980s, as the Honda partnership began to bear fruit. It took until 1987 for the active ride system to be deeme d ready for an FW11. The original target was to simply improve an F1 car’s ride and allow for softer suspension settings, but by now the penny had dropped that aerodynamic load distribution was the most significant gain. Always alert to atechni cal advantage, Nelson Piquet embraced the concept and took on testing duties, while team-mate Nigel Mansell – still haunted by unhappy active ride experimentsduring his time at Lotus – showed little interest. Piquet would give the system a winning debut at Monza that season, beating an ‘active’ Lotus driven by Ayrton Senna, but subsequent testson bumpier circuits highlighted its imperfections, including a tendency to generate ‘bounce’ in faster corners. It was dropped, for now. The following FW12 for 1988 was the first Williams designed specifically as an active ride F1 car, as the teamexplored methods to grab back performance after the loss of Honda’s all-powerful turbo V6 for a humble normally aspirated Judd V8. But again the system’s imperfections made it troublesome and by the British Grand Prix –