32 The Americas TheEconomistAugust 8th 2020
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Bello Beyond the troika of tyranny
“F
or thefirst time in history, you can
truly envision a western hemi-
sphere that is secure, democratic and
middle-class, from northern Canada to
southern Chile, and everywhere in be-
tween.” So said Joe Biden in a speech at
Harvard University in 2014. Much has
changed since then, not least the de-
struction of lives and livelihoods
wrought by the pandemic. Even so, were
Mr Biden to be elected president of the
United States in November, for many
Latin Americans he would offer a vision
that is reassuring and familiar compared
with the unpredictable sound and fury of
Donald Trump.
Mr Trump won in 2016 in part because
he promised to build a wall to keep out
Latin American immigrants, declaring
that Mexico was “not our friend”. Nev-
ertheless, he has developed relatively
good relations with the most important
governments in the region. Jair Bolso-
naro, Brazil’s president, used Mr Trump’s
success as a template for his own cam-
paign in 2018. He has closely aligned
Brazil’s foreign policy, normally in-
dependent, with the Trump administra-
tion’s views. Andrés Manuel López Obra-
dor, on his only foreign trip in 21 months
as Mexico’s leader, last month went to
Washington and praised Mr Trump’s
“kindness and respect”. To keep the
border open for trade, Mexico’s govern-
ment has collaborated in shutting it to
asylum-seekers.
Wary of Mr Trump’s threats of tariffs
and sanctions, many governments have
fallen into line “out of necessity and
especially out of fear”, says a Latin Amer-
ican official. Ordinary Latin Americans
are not impressed: the percentage who
express a favourable view of the United
States fell from the high 60s in 2015 to
around 45 in 2017, according to the Pew
Research Centre.
Mr Trump’s Latin American policy has
centred on a (so far) failed bid to overthrow
what John Bolton, his former national
security adviser, called “the troika of ty-
ranny”—the leftist dictatorships in Vene-
zuela, Cuba and Nicaragua. In his recent
memoir Mr Bolton blamed the failure to
oust Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, despite
swingeing sanctions, on Mr Trump’s lack
of constancy and foot-dragging inside the
administration. As important, the admin-
istration underestimated the difficulty of
prising the army away from Mr Maduro. Its
critics say its Latin American policies are
based on the president’s need to win Flori-
da, home to large Cuban and Venezuelan
diasporas, in November. “Domestic poli-
tics always figures in policy towards Latin
America, but never before to this degree,”
says Michael Shifter of Inter-American
Dialogue, a think-tank in Washington.
Were Mr Biden to win, his priorities
would be the American economy and
dealing with China. But Latin America
might not be at the bottom of his to-do list.
He knows the region far better than recent
presidents. In Barack Obama’s second
term Vice-President Biden took on re-
sponsibility for the Americas. “He dedi-
cated time to it, set out to learn about it
and talked to a lot of people in the re-
gion,” says the Latin American official.
Juan Gonzalez, who advised Mr Biden
on Latin America back then, stresses that
the region and the world are not as they
were in 2016. “The challenges are much
greater,” he says. But he thinks there are
opportunities for the United States in the
region, not just threats to be managed.
American firms that bring supply chains
back from China could benefit Mexico
and Central America. Mr Biden has long
supported immigration reform. As presi-
dent, he would be likely to resume his
previous policy in Central America, with
an aid programme aimed at fighting
corruption and deterring migration
through economic development.
On Venezuela, Mr Gonzalez says that
sanctions should be part of a broader
policy that would include seeking nego-
tiations for free elections. A Biden presi-
dency would revert to Mr Obama’s Cuba
policy, which saw engagement as more
likely to weaken the communist regime
than Mr Trump’s intensification of sanc-
tions. It would press Mr Bolsonaro on his
failure to protect the Amazon.
An immediate issue concerns leader-
ship of the Inter-American Development
Bank. Breaking with a 60-year under-
standing that its president is a Latin
American, the Trump administration
wants the job for Mauricio Claver-Ca-
rone, an official at the National Security
Council and an architect of its Venezuela
policy. He may get it at a meeting of the
bank’s governors next month. A Biden
administration would probably force
him out in favour of a less polarising
figure. To do that, Mr Biden must win.
A Biden presidency might seem reassuringly familiar to Latin Americans
the government cannot afford. The budget
deficit last year exceeded 10% of gdp. Mr
Santokhi persuaded public-sector unions
to wait for the pay rise. He has begged
banks for cash, raised income-tax rates and
deferred payment of a loan taken out last
year to buy a hydroelectric dam.
Suriname, like Guyana, is an emerging
petro-power. Apache, an American oil
company, and its French partner, Total, an-
nounced this year three big oil finds off-
shore. Others are about to drill. Surinamese
may share Guyanese worries over how well
the windfall will be managed. Mr Santokhi
is a former police commissioner and jus-
tice minister but the new vice-president,
Ronnie Brunswijk, seems less strait-laced.
He began his career as Mr Bouterse’s body-
guard, fought a guerrilla war against his
former boss in the 1980s, and has been con-
victed by a Dutch court for cocaine smug-
gling. He owns a football club and a gold-
mining business.
The oil will not flow for perhaps five
years, which means that Mr Santokhi,
whose term ends in 2025, may reap as little
political benefit from it as the unlucky Mr
Granger. The economy will shrink by 5%
this year, reckons the imf. Gold may help
before the oil money arrives. It accounted
for more than three-quarters of exports last
year. Investors’ mistrust of the dollar has
pushed its global price to a record high.
Dutch-speaking Suriname’s largest eth-
nic groups, like Guyana’s, are of African
and Indian origin. But its political divide
reflects attitudes to Mr Bouterse rather
than ethnic identity. He has now left the
scene. The fight over how to spend Suri-
name’s new riches, when they come, may
be less bitter than Guyana’s. That, perhaps,
is Suriname’s real gold. 7