The Economist - USA (2020-08-08)

TheEconomistAugust 8th 2020 Middle East & Africa 35

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U

ponarrivalatanexpensiverestau-

rantnearSandton,Johannesburg’s

financialdistrict,nothingfeelsunusual,

atleastinthisageofcovid-19.The

maître-d’zapsa temperaturegunat

patrons’maskedfacesandspritzestheir

handswithsanitiser.Onlywhenushered

intothediningroomdoessomething

seemodd:everytablehasa potoftea.

SouthAfricansliketheirrooibos,but

theliquidinmanytea-cupsisa darker

red—claret,even.Onothertablesthere

arecansoftonicnexttoteapots.Reality

dawnswhentwoyoungwomenaregiven

shotglassesofJägermeisterinsidetheir

tea-cups.

SouthAfricabannedalcoholsalesfor

thesecondtimethisyearonJuly12th,so

astopreventdrunksfromtakingup

preciousspaceinhospitals.Butrestau-

rants,whicharestrugglingtostayafloat,

areopenandcustomersarethirsty.“Are

youservingspecialteas?”yourcorre-

spondenthesitantlyasksa waiter.“Yes”,

hereplies,therippleofa smilejustvis-

iblefromtheedgesofhismask.

Anunscientificsampleoflocalestab-

lishmentssuggeststhepatchinessof

prohibition.A steakhouseinanaffluent

suburbalsousesteapotsforredwine,

andputscansoffizzyapplejuicenextto

glassesofbeer.Otherjointsaremore

brazen.Ata cafépopularwithfamilies,

parentskeeponeeyeontheirchildren

ricochetinginsidea bouncycastleand

theotherontheiricebucket.

ThewillingnessofSouthAfricansto

flouttheboozerulesisa signthatbans

rarelywork.It showsthatthepoliceare

unwillingorunabletoenforcethem—at

leastinrichareas.Butit alsoreflectshow

manySouthAfricansarereluctantto

obeylawssetbya rulingpartythatitself

showslittlerespectforpropriety.

Inrecentweekslocaljournalistshave

revealedhowmembersoftheAfrican

NationalCongressandtheirfamilies

havewonjuicycontractsforsupplying

personalprotectiveequipment,despite

havinglittleexperienceinmedicalkit.

Cronyismhasbeenrifeforyears,butthe

sightof“tenderpreneurs”coiningit is

especiallygallingwhenthousandsare

dying.OnAugust3rdPresidentCyril

Ramaphosacomparedsuchpeopleto

hyenascirclingwoundedprey.

Yethehasdonetoolittletostopthe

scavengers.Morethantwoyearsafterhe

tookoffice,SouthAfricansarewaiting

forprosecutionstobebroughtagainst

thoseaccusedofwrongdoingduringthe

reignofhispredecessor,JacobZuma.

Meanwhiletheformerpresidentcontin-

uestostallhisowntrialoveranarms

dealcutmorethan 20 yearsago.It is

enoughtomakeoneordera cupoftea.

Tea-total

Prohibitionina pandemic

JOHANNESBURG

TeasalesareboominginJohannesburgrestaurants.Atleastthat’sthestory...

15,000 unpeacekeepers. eu troops are also

training local soldiers. Yet if Mali’s govern-

ment is shown to lack legitimacy, Western

efforts are more likely to fail.

Dodgy legislative elections in March

and April triggered the protests. The poll,

which had been delayed for 17 months, was

rushed through as the covid-19 pandemic

began to spread. Turnout was only 35%.

When the results were first announced, the

ruling party got 41 of 147 seats, and lost al-

most all its seats in Bamako. A week later

the constitutional court awarded it another

ten seats, smoothing the path to a ruling

coalition and reinstating close allies of Mr

Keïta, one of whom has now been elected

president of the national assembly.

Though the questionable election provid-

ed the spark, it was “neither the principal

cause nor the motor of the protests”, says

Ibrahim Maïga, who is based in Bamako for

the Institute for Security Studies.

Much of the anger stems from the gov-

ernment’s inability to stop the violence. In

the first six months of this year more than

1,800 people were killed in fights involving

jihadist groups and ethnic militias, about

as many as were killed in the whole of last

year. On March 25th the main leader of the

opposition, Soumaïla Cissé, was seized by

gunmen, probably jihadists. He has not

been seen since. To make matters worse,

the French intervention itself is unpopu-

lar. One survey found that almost 60% of

Malians think that the French forces are in

cahoots with the insurgents.

Malians are fed up with corruption,

while the economy goes from bad to worse.

Karim Keïta, the president’s son, who

heads parliament’s defence committee, is a

particular target of derision. He resigned

from his post after videos circulated on so-

cial media showing him cavorting in Spain

with scantily clad women.

Yet President Keïta does not fit the

mould of those ousted by protests in other

parts of the region. He did not come to

power through the barrel of a gun. He has

been president since 2013 and is not expect-

ed to run for a third term in 2023. The main

charge against him is that he is out of touch

and incompetent. In normal circum-

stances he would be voted out.

Some now worry that Mr Dicko will use

his growing power to push Mali in a more

Islamist direction. In 2009 he campaigned

successfully against amending a law that

compels married women to obey their hus-

bands. He has inveighed against racy Mex-

ican telenovelasbroadcast during Ramadan

and against sex education in schools.

Other leaders in the Sahel may be more

worried that the crisis could spill over into

their countries. In late July five presidents

from the region flew to Bamako to mediate.

They proposed a reform of the constitu-

tional court, a government of national un-

ity, an inquiry into the deaths of protesters,

and new elections for 31 seats in parliament

that are still disputed. But the mps who

would have to run again rejected the idea.

So has the m5-rfp.

The gap between the parties is still wide.

Mr Dicko has suggested there may be a way

out without the president having to step

down. But the m5-rfpstill demands he

leaves. There are few good options. Most

Malian institutions are in trouble. The con-

stitutional court was dissolved in July. The

prime minister’s cabinet has only six min-

isters. The composition of the national as-

sembly is disputed. If the president were to

resign, it would mark “a big jump into the

void”, says Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim, who is

based in Dakar for the International Crisis

Group, a conflict-prevention ngo. Yet if Mr

Keïta were to stay on, violence in the streets

might worsen, he adds.

The truce is over. Some protests re-

sumed on August 3rd. Mr Keïta could still

seek to forge a compromise with the prot-

est leaders by sacking his prime minister,

Boubou Cissé. After all, he is already on his

sixth prime minister in seven years. Yet if

he merely plays musical chairs among the

elite and ignores deeper problems, says Mr

Maïga, “it will only delay the next bomb,

the next explosion.” And next time the

protests could be led by firebrands far more

radical than Mr Dicko. 7