Philosophy of the Performing Arts

88 performance and the classical paradigm
through the exercise of their creative freedom. It is because the performance
of a performable work requires interpretation that we have a use for a notion
of authenticity that differs from the one that applies to artworks outside the
performed arts. Authenticity here involves being true to the work in one’s
interpretation.
In examining the classical paradigm we have restricted our attention
almost entirely to performances of musical works. Indeed, our focus
has been even narrower, since our examples have been nineteenth- and
twentieth-century classical compositions in the Western tradition such as
Sibelius’s Second Symphony. In the case of performances like the one with
which we began Chapter 2, it is difficult to deny the explanatory force of
the classical paradigm as an account of what transpires. The performance is
clearly advertised as a performance of Sibelius’s Second Symphony, where
the symphony must, it seems, be something distinct from the particular
performance. It is attended by persons such as Berthold who bring to their
experience of the performance a critical and appreciative ear schooled
both in a knowledge of what is being performed and a history of attend-
ing other performances labeled as being “of ” the same thing. The musi-
cians and the conductor conceive their performance as an interpretation
of this thing, and are guided, in rehearsal and in concert performance, by
a score that they correctly take to record certain prescriptions laid down
by Sibelius in 1902.
To say that a performance is rightly subsumed under the classical para-
digm is not to deny that our appreciative interest may focus more on the
creative brilliance (or otherwise!) of the interpretation than on the work
interpreted. More significantly, in bringing a given performance under the
paradigm we do not foreclose on the possibility that the performance may
be, and may be appreciable as, a work of art in its own right. This was part
of our answer to Kivy’s worries about historically authentic performance at
the end of Chapter 4. But it is also the right way to respond to those who
suggest, conversely, that, if we are to uphold the artistic status of what per-
formers do, we must deny that the performances are of independent works
(see, for example, Jacobs 1990).
Assuming, then, that what Berthold attended was indeed a perform-
ance of a performable work, understood in the manner of the classical
paradigm, we can ask to what extent this is also the case for other per-
formances in the performing arts. In assessing the scope of the classical
paradigm, we must consider whether it applies more generally to musical
performances, and whether it also applies to performances in theater and
dance. In line with the methodological considerations that have guided us
thus far, we shall focus on the practices of performers, critics, and audi-
ence members. Our task is to determine whether those practices are best