free will and responsibility and—in its extreme Calvinist
form—to imply a God terrifyingly remote from human
ideas of morality and justice.
A rigorous doctrine of predestination was first set out
in the 5th century by St. Augustine of Hippo, largely as a
corrective to the Pelagian view that humans can merit sal-
vation through their own efforts. Augustine avoided com-
plete determinism by arguing that humans have the
freedom to choose whether or not to accept God’s salva-
tion. He also avoided the doctrine of so-called double pre-
destination, which holds that God foreordains not only
the salvation of the elect but also the damnation of the
nonelect—a doctrine subsequently condemned as heresy.
The standard medieval position sought to balance Augus-
tine’s severe analysis with a strong emphasis on God’s uni-
versal saving will and a recognition of human freedom and
responsibility; salvation is entirely owing to God’s grace,
damnation to man’s sin and guilt.
There was little controversy over this prevalent view
until the early 16th century, when the reformers’ insis-
tence on JUSTIFICATION BY FAITHalone drew LUTHERand
others back to the Augustinian position. Indeed, Luther’s
teaching here is hardly to be distinguished from Augus-
tine’s: humankind is in complete bondage to sin and
wholly unable to choose the good and to do it; neverthe-
less, individuals have the capacity to accept God’s free
offer of grace; God therefore predestines the elect to sal-
vation but cannot be said to predestine the nonelect to
damnation. There is, however, no systematic teaching on
predestination in Luther’s works, and he gives the impres-
sion of regarding the whole question as an inscrutable
mystery.
In contrast, predestination became a cornerstone of
the system devised by Calvin and elaborated by his fol-
lowers. Remorselessly logical, Calvin insisted on the con-
clusion that most of his predecessors had struggled to
avoid: that God foreordains the fate of the damned in ex-
actly the same sense as that of the saved, decreeing mem-
bership of the elect or the nonelect with no reference to an
individual’s faith or works. Calvin therefore rejected the
idea of God’s universal saving will and the belief that
Christ’s death was offered for the whole of humanity, both
of which were firmly upheld by Luther. Any vestiges of
free will are removed by Calvin’s insistence that divine
grace is both irresistible (it cannot be refused) and inde-
fectible (it cannot be forfeited once conferred). However
dreadful it may seem, such a system is perfectly consistent
with both justice and goodness, since the damned receive
the just reward for their sins and the saved are favored be-
yond their merits.
In the years after Calvin’s death these doctrines be-
came ever more central to the teaching of the Reformed
Church. Differences of opinion were limited to the ques-
tion of whether God destined a portion of the human race
to damnation before the beginning of time (supralapsari-
anism) or only after the Fall (sublapsarianism). A more
fundamental challenge arose at the turn of the 17th cen-
tury, when Jacobus Arminius (see ARMINIANISM), a theolo-
gian of the Dutch Reformed Church, reacted against
Calvin’s determinism by affirming free will in humans and
denying that Christ died for the elect alone; predestination
was best understood as God’s foreknowledge of those who
would persevere in faith and good works. The definitive
statement of Arminian views in the so-called Remon-
strance of 1610 (see REMONSTRANTS) sparked a long and
bitter controversy in Holland, which impinged upon po-
litical issues. Following the Synod of DORT’s reaffirmation
of strict Calvinist doctrine (1618), many leading Armini-
ans were exiled or imprisoned (the latter including
GROTIUS). The breach between Calvinist and Arminian
tendencies would for centuries remain an important fault-
line within the Protestant Churches generally.
In the Roman Catholic Church, the issue of predesti-
nation received renewed attention in the intellectual fer-
ment of the COUNTER-REFORMATION, which saw various
attempts to reconcile human free will with the doctrine of
divine election. The most notable of these was that of Luis
de MOLINA, who reinterpreted predestination as divine
foreknowledge of free human choices. This was widely
taken up by the JESUITSbut vigorously attacked by more
conservative thinkers, especially those in the Dominican
tradition. Controversy continued until 1607, when the
pope ruled that neither Molina’s view nor its denial should
be considered heretical—a position that the Church has
since maintained.Primaticcio, Francesco (1504–1570) Italian painter and
architect
Bolognese by birth, Primaticcio learned his decorative
skills as the assistant of GIULIO ROMANOduring the deco-
ration of the Palazzo del TÈ, Mantua (1525–32). In 1532
he was summoned to France by FRANCIS Ito work on the
decoration of the château at FONTAINEBLEAU. Although
much of the important work he did there has been de-
stroyed, some rooms, such as the Chambre de la Duchesse
d’Étampes (c. 1541–45) and the Galerie Henri II (1552–
56), survive in an altered form. After the death of ROSSO
FIORENTINO, with whom he worked there, Primaticcio be-
came head of the workshop at Fontainebleau, despite the
opposition of CELLINI, and continued to produce sumptu-
ous paintings in a mannerist style that favored mytholog-
ical subjects and elongated nudes after the fashion of
Parmigianino. Other works include the Valois chapel at
St.-Denis and the Aile de la Belle Cheminée at
Fontainebleau (1568).Primavera, La One of a series of paintings on pagan
mythological subjects made by BOTTICELLIprobably in
the early 1480s. It is likely that it was commissioned
by Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco de’ Medici for the Villa diPPrriimmaavveerraa,, LLaa 339911