The EconomistNovember 7th 2020 BriefingCovid-19 in Europe 212
1reinforces the need for governments to
make better use of whatever time they do
manage to buy.
Asian nations, some democratic, some
not, have proved it possible to force infec-
tion rates so low as to more or less eradicate
the disease. But when they came out of
their first lockdown European countries
were unwilling to impose the strictures
they thought would be necessary for true
eradication. Many doubtless thought that
their citizens would not put up with them.
They chose instead a strategy in which va-
rious not-too-onerous modifications in
everyday behaviour would keep the level of
infection low enough for their health sys-
tems to be able to cope.
This strategy of containment has, un-
fortunately, proved fragile. But it remains
the only one that most European nations
see as viable. When the current lockdowns
run their course, they need to follow it bet-
ter. New tools may help them do so. Cheap-
er and quicker tests are already becoming
available, and fairly soon there may be
antibody and other treatments which, giv-
en early, reduce the risk of severe disease,
and which might even offer some degree of
prophylaxis. There could also be a signifi-
cant boost to morale if, during the lock-
downs, vaccine trials provide good news.
Seeing a fairly near-term way out of the
bind may make people more willing to sub-
mit to constraints in the meantime.Clad in black mortality
But not everything can be put right with
more effective and appropriate interven-
tions and a dash of hope. Policies that meet
the need for containment are vital; and
they have to be communicated, and carried
forward, in ways that generate public trust,
and thereby compliance.
A large part of the reason for the resur-
gence is that the policies Europe put in
place to keep the disease manageable did
not take full account of its peculiarities.
The number of others to whom an infected
person will pass the covid virus varies a lot
(see Graphic detail). Most will not pass it on
to anyone; a few will pass it on to many. It is
estimated that just 10-20% of infected peo-
ple account for about 80% of subsequent
infections, with those subsequent infec-
tions often occurring in clusters. The big-
gest clusters are spawned in crowded
spaces, especially those where ventilation
is poor or people talk loudly to others at
close range.
In Japan, this aspect of the disease was
appreciated from the outset, in part
through studies of the outbreak on Dia-
mond Princess, a cruise liner, says Oshitani
Hitoshi, a virologist at Tohoku University
who sits on the national covid-19 task force.
As early as March the Japanese government
began warning its citizens to avoid the
“3Cs”: closed spaces, crowded places andclose-contactsettings.Thiswasontopofa
near universal use of face masks, to which
the Japanese, like many other Asians, were
already well accustomed.
The 3Cs message was far less clear in Eu-
rope. Public-health authorities stressed
continued mask-wearing, which increased
almost everywhere, reaching Asian levels
quite early on in Italy and Spain (see chart 2
on next page). Yet many countries also al-
lowed bars and nightclubs to re-open with
no strings attached. In parts of eastern Eu-
rope, where the current outbreak is partic-
ularly bad, football fans were filling up sta-
diums even as cases were on the rise.
Holidays abroad did a lot of damage,
too—as they had in the initial outbreak.
Many of the European chains of transmis-
sion mapped in February and March turned
out to have originated in Alpine ski resorts.
Studies of viral genomes show that much
of the current outbreak can be tracked back
to holidaymakers from around the conti-
nent mingling in Spain.
European countries tried to limit cross-
border contagion by requiring people re-
turning, or arriving, from places deemed
high-risk to quarantine themselves. Buttherewerelotsofsuchtravellersanden-
forcement was lax; no one knows how
many actually complied. No European
country has enforced such measures in the
way that Australia, New Zealand and va-
rious East Asian countries have, confining
incomers to hotels or barracks.
If test-and-trace systems worked across
borders this might matter less. But these
systems are, for the most part, each limited
to a single nation, making it impossible for
them to get to grips with international
transmission. They are also, for the most
part, not terribly good, and as caseloads
have grown their shortcomings have been
mercilessly exposed. Only 23% of those
tested in person in England over the week
to October 22nd received results within 24
hours, down from 93% at the end of June.
And just 45% of those testing positive re-
ceived a call from a contact tracer within a
day of their diagnosis, down from around
80% over the summer.
Even Germany, which has had one of
Europe’s best test-and-trace systems, is
now struggling. Its contact tracers have the
capacity to do follow up on all cases as long
as the number of infections stays below 50
per 100,000 population per week. The na-
tional infection rate exceeded that limit on
October 21st; it now stands at around 125.
Today three-quarters of new infections in
Germany can no longer be adequately
traced to their source, Angela Merkel, the
German chancellor, told her fellow citizens
on November 2nd. This, she said, was why
the country had to return to lockdown, al-
beit a “light” one: bars, gyms and entertain-
ment venues are closed and restaurants
limited to takeaways; shops, offices,
schools and factories remain open.
Mrs Merkel delivered her message with
a certain amount of reproach. “There was a
lot of negligence”, she said, in Germany’s
“carefree summer”. Some younger Ger-
mans and other Europeans, aware that theCovid-19,weeklyconfirmed cases per 100,000Sources: ECDC; Eurostat; national
statistical & health agencies; The Economist *Or latest available50
100
150
200
250
300
350July average, 2020 November 2nd* 2020Déjà vu
Europe*, daily covid-19 deaths, 2020
Seven-day moving averageSource:JohnsHopkinsUniversityCSSE *50countries/territories15,0004,0003,0002,0001,0000
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