more certain of the terms involved, and this in turn sends us back for a review of
our concepts or the experience upon which the terms depend. It is evident that no
two persons can have just the same concepts, for all have not had the same
experience out of which their concepts came. The concepts may be named the
same, and may be nearly enough alike so that we can usually understand each
other; but, after all, I have mine and you have yours, and if we could each see the
other's in their true light, no doubt we should save many misunderstandings and
quarrels.
6. REASONING
All the mental processes which we have so far described find their culmination
and highest utility in reasoning. Not that reasoning comes last in the list of
mental activities, and cannot take place until all the others have been completed,
for reasoning is in some degree present almost from the dawn of consciousness.
The difference between the reasoning of the child and that of the adult is largely
one of degree—of reach. Reasoning goes farther than any of the other processes
of cognition, for it takes the relations expressed in judgments and out of these
relations evolves still other and more ultimate relations.
Nature of Reasoning.—It is hard to define reasoning so as to describe the
precise process which occurs; for it is so intermingled with perception,
conception, and judgment, that one can hardly separate them even for purposes
of analysis, much less to separate them functionally. We may, however, define
reasoning provisionally as thinking by means of a series of judgments with the
purpose of arriving at some definite end or conclusion. What does this mean?
Professor Angell has stated the matter so clearly that I will quote his illustration
of the case:
"Suppose that we are about to make a long journey which necessitates the choice
from among a number of possible routes. This is a case of the genuinely
problematic kind. It requires reflection, a weighing of the pros and cons, and
giving of the final decision in favor of one or other of several alternatives. In
such a case the procedure of most of us is after this order. We think of one route
as being picturesque and wholly novel, but also as being expensive. We think of
another as less interesting, but also as less expensive. A third is, we discover, the
most expedient, but also the most costly of the three. We find ourselves
confronted, then, with the necessity of choosing with regard to the relative merits
of cheapness, beauty, and speed. We proceed to consider these points in the light