and injustice gave him a repellent manner.' Faced with criticism he could not bear, he took refuge
in illness.
A lot of Davis' strategic difficulties were his own fault. Despite conscripting go percent of its
able white manpower, the South was always short of troops. In January 1862 its army rolls
numbered 351,418, against a Unionist strength of 575,917. It reached its maximum in January
1864, when 481,180 were counted under the Confederate flag. Therafter the South's army
declined in strength whereas the North's rose, so that in January 1865 the respective numbers
were 445,203 and 959,460.78 That being so, Davis should have concentrated his smaller forces
in limited areas. Instead, he took seriously and followed to the letter his inauguration oath to
defend every inch of Confederate territory. This was an impossible task. It involved, to begin
with, defending over 3,500 miles of coastline, without a navy to speak of. Texas alone had 1,200
miles of border. If Kentucky had seceded, it would have provided a simple water-border. For a
time it kept out both sides, but eventually the Unionists menaced the South from there too.
Missouri was also divided but its settled eastern reaches, centered on St Louis, were firmly
Unionist, and that left an almost indefensible 300-mile straight-line border in northern Arkansas.
Hence a large percentage of the Confederate army, perhaps a third or even more, was always
employed on non-combative defensive duties when its active commanders were clamoring
desperately for troops. It is true that the Unionists also used vast numbers of men on the
gradually extending lines of communication-but then they had more men to use.
Early in the war the Confederate capital was moved from Montgomery to Richmond, mainly
to insure that Virginia stayed committed to the fight. This was a mixed blessing. The polished
Virginians regarded the South Carolinans, who formed the core of the government, as
loudmouthed, flashy, dangerous extremists. They looked down their noses at the Davises. The
ladies noted Varina's dark color and thick lips, comparing her to a refined mulatto cook' and called her theEmpress,' a reference to the much-despised Eugenie, wife of the French dictator,
Napoleon III. The Georgians, especially Thomas Cobb, were hostile to Davis: he was, said Cobb,
as obstinate as a mule,' and they dismissed J. P. Benjamin (1811-84), the AttorneyGeneral and by far the ablest member of the Confederate government, as aJew dog.' Senator Louis T.
Wigfall of Texas was a strong Davis supporter until their wives fell out, wherupon Charlotte
Wigfall, a South Carolina snob, called Varina a course, western woman' withobjectionable'
manners, and Wigfall preached mutiny and sedition in the Congress, often when drunk.
Confederate Richmond gradually became a snakepit of bitter social and political feuds, and the
Davises ceased to entertain.
Once Northern armies began to penetrate Confederate soil, the interests of the states diverged
and it was everyone for himself, reflected in Richmond's savage political feuding. It is a curious
paradox that ordinary Southerners, who had not been consulted, fought the war with
extraordinary courage and endurance, while their elites, who had plunged them into
Armageddon, were riven by rancorous factions and disloyalty, and many left the stricken scene
long before the end. Davis was too proud, aloof, and touchy to build up his own faction. He
thought it beneath him to seek popularity or to flatter men into doing their duty. Hence close friends sometimes left shaking their heads or fists, red with anger and determined never to call on him again.'" But at least he went down with the stricken cause, ending up in Unionist fetters.
It may be asked: all this being so, why did the South fight so well? Why did the war last so long?
In the first place, it has to be understood that Lincoln was operating under many restraints. He
did not seek war, want war, or, to begin with, consider he was in any way gifted to wage it. He