it, as he said repeatedly, to preserve the Union. But by the early summer of 1862 he was
convinced that, by divine providence, the Union was safe, and it was his duty to change the
object of the war: to wash away the sin of the Constitution and the Founding Fathers, and make
all the people of the United States, black as well as white, free. Providence had guided him to
this point; now providence would guide him further and suggest the precise time when the
announcement should be made, so as to bring victory nearer.
Lincoln had weighed all the practical arguments on either side some time before he became
convinced, for reasons which had little to do with political factors, that the slaves should be
declared free, and laid his decision before the Cabinet on July 22. He told his colleagues he had
resolved upon this step, and had not called them together to ask their advice but to lay the subject-matter of a proclamation before them.' Their response was pragmatic. Edwin M. Stanton (1814-69), Secretary of War, and Edward Bates (1793-1869), Attorney-General, urged immediate promulgation' for maximum effect. Chase thought it would unsettle the government's
financial position. Postmaster-General Montgomery Blair (1813-83) said it would cost them the
fall elections. Lincoln was unperturbed. The decision was taken: all that was now required was
guidance over the timing. `We mustn't issue it until after a victory,' he said, many times. That
victory came, as he knew it would, on September 17, with Antietam. Five days later, on
September 22, the Emancipation Proclamation, the most revolutionary document in United
States history since the Declaration of Independence, was made public, effective from January 1,
- Despite an initially mixed reception, the ultimate impact of this move on the progress of
the war was entirely favorable-as Lincoln, listening to the heedings of providence, knew it would
be.
Political considerations-holding the Union together, putting his case before world opinion, in
which emancipation played a key part, satisfying his own mind that the war was just and being
justly pursued-were not the only considerations for Lincoln, or even the chief ones. The
overriding necessity, once the fighting began, was to win, and that Lincoln found the most
difficult of all. His problem was not providing the men and the supplies, or the money to pay for
them. The money was spent on a prodigious scale, and soon exceeded $2 million a day. At the
outset of the conflict, the US public debt, which had risen slowly since President Jackson wiped
it out, was a little under $70 million. By January 11, 1866, when the end of the insurrection was
officially proclaimed, it stood at $2,773 million. But Congress was willing to vote heavy taxes
including, for the first time, a tax on personal incomes of from 3 to 5 percent (it was phased out
in 1872). All the same, payments in specie had to be suspended at the end of December 1861,
and in February 1862 Lincoln signed an Act making Treasury notes legal tender. This was
followed by the issue of greenbacks, so called on account of their color, both simple paper and
interest-bearing.
The fluctuations in the value of government paper against gold were at times frenzied,
depending on the military news, and some serious mistakes were made. In attempts to reduce
inflation, Treasury Secretary Chase went in person to the Wall Street markets and sold gold, and
he got Congress to pass an Act prohibiting contracts in gold on pain of fines and imprisonment.
This crude and brazen attempt to interfere with the market proved disastrous. Chase was forced
to resign, and his successor, William P. Fessenden (1806-69), quickly persuaded Congress to
withdraw it. But on the whole inflation was kept under control and some of the wartime
measures-the transformation of 1,400 state banks of issue into a much smaller number of
national banks, 1863-4, for instance-were highly beneficial and became permanent.