Preindustrial Europe: Science, the Economy, and Political Reorganization 301and virtuous housewives at work in an idealized vision
of domesticity that was central to Dutch notions of the
good life. Rembrandt van Rijn (1606–69), Frans Hals
(c. 1581–1666), and a host of others left brilliant por-
traits of city magistrates, corporate directors, and
everyday drunks as well as grand illustrations of histori-
cal events. The brooding skies and placid landscapes of
the Netherlands were painted by such masters as Ruis-
dael and van Goyen, while dozens of still lifes dwell
lovingly on food, flowers, and other everyday objects.
The political and the social structure of the repub-
lic rested on the values of the late medieval city, pre-
served tenaciously through the long struggle against
Spanish regalism. Each town elected a council, which
in turn elected representatives to the Provincial Estates.
The States General was elected by the provinces. The
stadtholder, when there was one, was not a king, but a
kind of “first citizen” with special responsibilities for the
conduct of war on land. Five admiralties, each of which
was nominally independent and each of which supple-
mented its own warships with vessels leased from the
chartered companies, conducted war at sea.
Local privilege was built into the system at every
level, and conflict among the various components of
the body politic was normally intense. Fortunately, the
leadership of the councils, states, directorships, and
committees formed a kind of interlocking directorship.
A great merchant, banker, or rentier might hold several
elected offices in the course of a lifetime, as well as di-
rectorships in one or more of the chartered companies.
The Dutch republic was an oligarchy, not a democracy,
but the existence of a well-defined group of prominent
citizens facilitated communication, dampened local ri-
valries, and helped to ensure a measure of continuity in
what might otherwise have been a fragmented and
overly decentralized system.
National policies were remarkably consistent.
Trade, even with the enemy, was encouraged and the
states supported freedom of the seas long before Hugo
Grotius (1583–1645), attorney general of Holland,
publicized the modern concept of international law.
Though aggressive in its pursuit of new markets and the
protection of old ones, Dutch foreign policy was other-
wise defensive.
Tension between the governing elite and the
stadtholders of the House of Orange dominated inter-
nal politics. At times the struggle took the form of reli-
gious antagonism between extreme Calvinists, who
tended to be Orangists supported by the artisan class,
and the more relaxed Arminians, who rejected predesti-
nation and were supported by the great merchants.
Class feeling played a major part in these struggles, but
by comparison with other countries, both sides re-
mained committed to religious toleration. Jewish settle-
ment was actively encouraged and Catholics were
generally protected from harassment. Holland became
a refuge for the persecuted, many of whom, such as
Descartes and the philosopher Baruch Spinoza
(1632–77), a Sephardic Jew, added luster to its intellec-
tual life. The Dutch republic was an oasis of tolerance
as well as prosperity.The Reorganization of War and
Government: France under Louis XIV
Most seventeenth-century states were not as fortunate as
the Dutch. Between 1560 and 1648 France, Spain, Eng-
land, and the German principalities all suffered in vary-
ing degrees from military stalemate and political
disintegration. Public order, perhaps even dynastic sur-
vival, depended upon the reorganization of war and gov-
ernment. The restructuring of virtually every European
state after 1660 has been called the triumph of abso-
lutism (see document 16.4), but the term is in some ways
misleading. No government before the industrial revolu-
tion could exert absolute control over the lives of its sub-
jects. To do so even approximately requires modern
transport and communications, but if by absolutism one
means the theoretical subordination of all other elements
of a country’s power structure to the crown, the word is
at least partially descriptive. The Spain of Philip II met
this definition in the sixteenth century; after 1660 the
model for all other states was the France of Louis XIV.
Louis XIV (ruled 1643–1715) came to the throne as
a child of four. To the end of his life he harbored child-
hood memories of the Frondes and was determined to
avoid further challenges from the French aristocracy at
all costs. He knew that their influence derived from the
networks of patronage that had long dominated rural
life and used the fact that such networks are ultimately
dependent upon favors to destroy them as independent
bases of power. As king of a country in which perpetual
taxation had long been established, Louis had more fa-
vors to hand out than anyone else. He developed the
tactic of forcing aristocrats to remain at court as a con-
dition of receiving the titles, grants, monopolies, of-
fices, and commissions upon which their influence was
based. By doing so he bound them to himself while cut-
ting them off from their influence in the countryside.
This was the real purpose behind the construction
of Versailles, a palace large enough to house the entire
court while separating it from the mobs of Paris, twelve