The fighting 265Mobile, which would help protect the Army
of Tennessee in its isolated march, and that
two more of McPherson's divisions were
delayed up north, Sherman had to revamp
everything. Thomas, who had honed
intelligence gathering to a fine art,
ascertained that gaps in the mountainous
country to the south and west of Johnston's
army were lightly defended. Sherman
determined that a hold flanking movement
might be able to push into Johnston's rear,
sever his rail link to Atlanta, and then strike
the Rebel flank as the army retreated.
In early May, in conjunction with Grant's
campaign against Lee, Sherman opened the
offensive. Thomas held Johnston in place
with an excellent feint, while McPherson
slipped around the Rebel left flank. On
8 May. Union troops advanced into Snake
Creek Gap, not far from Resaca and the
railroad. But the next day, federal troops
discovered a body of Confederates in a
fortified position. Uneasy over his isolated
situation, McPherson decided that he lacked
the strength to assail the enemy. He
withdrew to the gap, but this alone forced
Johnston to retreat. Had Mcpherson's army
possessed its full complement of troops, or
had Sherman accepted Thomas's offer of
lending some of his army, the campaign
might have proved disastrous for Johnston.
As it was, the flanking movement dislodged
the Rebels from a great defensive position.
As Johnston's command retreated, it
picked up some valuable reinforcements.
Polk brought what amounted to another
corps, to join with those under Hardee and
Lieutenant-General John Bell Hood, who had
earned a great reputation in Lee's army as a
brigade and division commander and had
possessed the great fortune of spearheading
the drive through Rosecrans's gap at
Chickamauga.
Johnston took a defensive position
around Resaca and then to the southwest
along the northern bank of the Oostanaula
River. After some fighting, especially on the
Confederate right. Sherman's men forced a
crossing over the Oostanaula. and by
15 May, Johnston had to fall back again.
The pattern of Sherman fixing and turning
his enemy continued. When Johnston
planned a counterstroke, as he did at
Cassville, Hood hesitated. The corps
commander accepted a report that Union
troops were approaching his rear and
canceled the attack. Johnston then fell back
to the Etowah River and a formidable
defensive position at Allatoona. But he could
not lure Sherman into an assault. The Union
command slipped again to the west, and the
Rebels retreated to the area around Dallas and
New Hope Church, tossing up strong field
works for protection. The federals followed
suit. The two sides then skirmished with each
other, but neither launched a major attack.
By shifting to the west, Sherman had
drawn Johnston away from the Western &
Atlantic Railroad, the Confederate supply
line to Atlanta. The Union commander tried
to swing his army around the Rebel right
flank, gain control of the railroad, and
compel the Confederates to attack him.
Instead, Johnston beat him there and
occupied some high ground near Marietta. In
mid-June, Sherman's command butted up
against the Rebels, probing for any
weaknesses or opportunities. Finally, on
27 June, Sherman committed the kind of
blunder that Johnston had sought weeks
earlier. Believing that the Confederates had
extended their line so far that it was weak in
the center, Sherman hurled men up slopes in
two locations. Troops in both Thomas's and
McPherson's army were repulsed. At these
encounters, collectively called the Battle of
Kennesaw Mountain, the Union suffered
3,000 casualties, while inflicting only 600.
With Johnston and much of the
Confederate army distracted by the attack
around Kennesaw Mountain, Schofield's
troops slid past the Rebels on the Union
right and, again, Johnston had to fall back
toward Atlanta, occupying a prepared line.
By 5 July, McPherson had bypassed that
position, and the Union flanks touched the
Chattahoochee River. To get his army over
the river, Sherman feigned a crossing on his
right, had Thomas fix Johnston's army, and
directed Schofield to cross the river