Antietam to Gettysburg 387jokingly, sideburns). Burnside was a good corps com-
mander, but he lacked the self-confidence essential to
anyone who takes responsibility for major decisions.
He knew his limitations and tried to avoid high com-
mand, but patriotism and his sense of duty compelled
him, when pressed, to accept leadership of the Army
of the Potomac. He prepared to march on Richmond.
Unlike McClellan, Burnside was aggressive—too
aggressive. He planned to ford the Rappahannock
River at Fredericksburg. Supply problems and bad
weather delayed him until mid-December, giving Lee
time to concentrate his army in impregnable positions
behind the town. Although he had more than
120,000 men against Lee’s 75,000, Burnside should
have called off the attack when he saw Lee’s advan-
tage; instead he ordered the troops forward. Crossing
the river over pontoon bridges, his divisions occupied
Fredericksburg. Then, in wave after wave, they
charged the Confederate defense line while Lee’s
artillery riddled them from nearby Marye’s Heights.
Watching the battle from his command post on the
heights, General Lee was deeply moved. Turning to
General James Longstreet, he said, “It is well that war
is so terrible—we should grow too fond of it!”
On December 14, the day following this futile
assault, General Burnside, tears streaming down his
cheeks, ordered the evacuation of Fredericksburg.
Shortly thereafter General Joseph Hooker replaced him.
Unlike Burnside, “Fighting Joe” Hooker was ill-
tempered, vindictive, and devious. In naming him to
command the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln sent him
a letter that was a measure of his desperation but is now
famous for what it reveals of the president’s character:
I think that during Gen. Burnside’s command of
the Army, you have taken counsel of your ambition,
and thwarted him as much as you could, in which
you did a great wrong to the country.... I have
heard, in such a way as to believe it, of you,
recently saying that both the Army and the
Government need a Dictator. Of course it is not for
this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the
command. Only those generals who gain successes,
can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is mili-
tary success, and I will risk the dictatorship....
Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless
vigilance, go forward, and give us victories.
Hooker proved no better than his predecessor, but
his failings were more like McClellan’s than Burnside’s.
By the spring of 1863 he had 125,000 men ready for
action. Late in April he forded the Rappahannock and
quickly concentrated at Chancellorsville, about ten
miles west of Fredericksburg. His army outnumbered
the Confederates by more than two to one; he should
have forced a battle at once. Instead he delayed, and
while he did, Lee sent Stonewall Jackson’s corps of
28,000 men across tangled countryside to a position
directly athwart Hooker’s unsuspecting flank. At 6 PM
on May 2, Jackson attacked.
Completely surprised, the Union right crumbled,
brigade after brigade overrun before it could wheel to
meet Jackson’s charge. At the first sound of firing, Lee
had struck along the entire front to impede Union
troop movements. If the battle had begun earlier in
the day, the Confederates might have won a decisive
victory; as it happened, nightfall brought a lull, and
the next day the Union troops rallied and held their
ground. Heavy fighting continued until May 5, when
Hooker abandoned the field and retreated in good
order behind the Rappahannock.
Chancellorsville cost the Confederates dearly, for
their losses, in excess of 12,000, were almost as heavy
as the North’s and harder to replace. They also lost
Stonewall Jackson, struck down by the bullets of his
own men while returning from a reconnaissance.
Nevertheless, the Union army had suffered another
fearful blow to its morale.
Lee knew that time was still on the side of the
North; to defend Richmond was not enough. Already
federal troops in the West were closing in on Vicksburg,
threatening to cut Confederate communications withC
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tomacR.Brandy Station
(June 9, 1863)Gettysburg
(July 1–3, 1863)Chancellorsville
(May 1–4, 1863)Washington D.C.FredericksburgArea controlled by Union
Area controlled by Confederacy
Union advance
Confederate advance
Confederate retreatUnion victory
Confederate victory
(June 9,1863)Date of victoryPENNSYLVANIAW. VA.MARYLANDVIRGINIALee Meda
eSt
uartHookerGettysburg Campaign, 1863As Lee’s main army advanced north,
Meade paralleled his movements to the east, preventing Lee from
attacking Baltimore or Philadelphia. When the armies converged at
Gettysburg, Lee was for the first time soundly defeated. Jeb Stuart,
Lee’s calvalry commander, had been marauding to the east and
missed the decisive engagement.