704 Chapter 26 The New Deal: 1933–1941
sides, thus removing the United States as an influence
in the conflict. Although Roosevelt accepted the
change, the internationalists in Congress did not, and
when they withdrew their support the measure died.
The danger of another world war mounted steadily
as Germany, Italy, and Japan repeatedly resorted to force
to achieve their expansionist aims. In March 1935 Hitler
instituted universal military training and denounced the
settlement at Versailles. In May Mussolini massed troops
in Italian Somaliland, using a trivial border clash as a
pretext for threatening the ancient kingdom of Ethiopia.
Congress responded by passing a series of
neutrality actsto prevent the United States from
being drawn into a wider war. The Neutrality Act of
1935 forbade the sale of munitions to all belligerents
whenever the president should proclaim that a state
of war existed. Americans who took passage on bel-
ligerent ships after such a proclamation had been
issued would do so at their own risk. Roosevelt would
have preferred a discretionary embargo or no new
legislation at all, but he dared not rouse the ire of the
isolationists by vetoing the bill.
In October 1935 Italy invaded Ethiopia and
Roosevelt invoked the new neutrality law. Secretary of
State Cordell Hull asked American exporters to sup-
port a “moral embargo” on the sale of oil and other
products not covered by the act. His plea was ignored;
oil shipments to Italy tripled between October and
January. Italy quickly overran and annexed Ethiopia.
In February 1936 Congress passed a second neutrality
act forbidding all loans to belligerents.
Then, in the summer of 1936, civil war broke out
in Spain. The rebels, led by the reactionary General
Francisco Franco and strongly backed by Italy and
Germany, sought to overthrow the somewhat leftist
Spanish Republic. Here, clearly, was a clash between
democracy and fascism, and the neutrality laws did
not apply to civil wars. However, Roosevelt now
became more fearful of involvement than some isola-
tionists. The president believed that American inter-
ference might cause the conflict in Spain to become a
global war, and he was wary of antagonizing the sub-
stantial number of American Catholics who were sym-
pathetic to the Franco regime. At his urging Congress
passed another neutrality act broadening the arms
embargo to cover civil wars.
Isolationism now reached its peak. A public opin-
ion poll revealed in March 1937 that 94 percent of
the people thought American policy should be
directed at keeping out of all foreign wars rather than
trying to prevent wars from breaking out. In April
Congress passed still another neutrality law. It contin-
ued the embargo on munitions and loans, forbade
Americans to travel on belligerent ships, and gave the
president discretionary authority to place the sale of
other goods to belligerents on a cash-and-carry basis.
This played into the hands of the aggressors. While
German planes and cannons were turning the tide in
Spain, the United States was denying the hard-pressed
Spanish loyalists even a case of cartridges.
In January 1938 the House narrowly defeated
the Ludlow amendment, which would have prohib-
ited Congress from declaring war without the prior
approval of the nation’s voters.
“With every surrender the prospects of a
European war grow darker,” Claude G. Bowers, the
American ambassador to Spain, warned. The New
York Herald Tribunepointed out that the neutrality
legislation was literally reactionary—designed to keep
the United States out of the war of 1914–1918, not
the conflict looming on the horizon. President
Roosevelt, in part because of domestic problems such
as the Supreme Court packing struggle and the wave
of sit-down strikes, and in part because of his own
vacillation, seemed to have lost control over the for-
mulation of American foreign policy. The American
people, like wild creatures before a forest fire, were
rushing in blind panic from the conflagration.War Again in Asia and Europe
There were limits beyond which Americans would
not go. In July 1937 the Japanese resumed their con-
quest of China, pressing ahead on a broad front.
Roosevelt believed that invoking the neutrality law
would only help the well-armed Japanese. Taking
advantage of the fact that neither side had formally
declared war, he allowed the shipment of arms and
supplies to both sides.
Then the president went further. Speaking in
Chicago in October, he condemned nations—he men-
tioned none by name—who were “creating a state of
international anarchy and instability from which there
is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality.” The
way to deal with “the epidemic of world lawlessness”
was to “quarantine” it. Evidently Roosevelt had no
specific plan in mind; nevertheless the “quarantine
speech” produced a windy burst of isolationist
rhetoric that forced him to back down. “It’s a terrible
thing,” he said, “to look over your shoulder when you
are trying to lead—and to find no one there.”
Roosevelt came gradually to the conclusion that
resisting aggression was more important than keeping
out of war, but when he did, the need to keep the
country united led him at times to be less than candid
in his public statements. Hitler’s annexation of
Austria in March 1938 caused him deep concern. The
Nazis’ vicious anti-Semitism had caused many of
Germany’s 500,000 Jewish citizens to seek refuge
abroad. Now 190,000 Austrian Jews were under Nazi
control. When Roosevelt learned that the Germans
were burning synagogues, expelling Jewish children